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HIGH COURT AFFIRMS SEIZURE LAWS
Critics Say Ruling Will Penalize Many Property Owners Unfairly
Los Angeles Daily News
Tuesday, March 5, 1996
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder Tribune News Wire
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 ruling Monday
that provoked outrage from dissenters, bolstered the
government's power to seize property linked to a
crime - even if the owner is blameless.
The loser in the case was Tina Bennis, a
Michigan mother of five who was unaware that her
husband, John, would use their jointly owned car to
pick up a prostitute and commit an illegal sex act in
the front seat. Officials confiscated the Bennis'
1-year-old Pontiac and sold it under a tough
Michigan public-nuisance statute.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing the
majority opinion, cited "a long and unbroken line of
cases" since 1827 holding that "an owner's interest
in property may be forfeited" even though the owner
did not know it would be put to illegal use. Those
cases, he declared, "are too firmly fixed ... to be
now displaced."
In a blistering dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens
said the seizure of Tina Bennis' car was blatantly
unjust. "Fundamental fairness prohibits the
punishment of innocent people," he observed.
Most federal forfeiture laws do furnish
protection to innocent owners. Some legal experts
said police and prosecutors in some states now may
become more aggressive in seizing crime-linked
-property, even when owners or co-owners did
nothing wrong. Others predicted that the ruling
would encourage legislative reforms.
Stevens said he feared that Rehnquist's logic
would permit states "to exercise virtually unbridled
power to confiscate vast amounts of property where
professional criminals have engaged in illegal acts."
For example, Stevens said, the chief justice's ruling
would "justify the confiscation of an ocean liner just
because one of its passengers sinned while on
board."
None of the court's precedents allow forfeitures
to go that far, Rehnquist replied.
Tina Bennis, who lives with her husband and
five children in Royal Oak, north of Detroit, could
not be reached for comment because, her lawyer
said, she was embarrassed by the publicity
surrounding the case and had obtained a private
telephone number. But the lawyer, Stefan B. Herpel
of Ann Arbor, Mich., said, "She is stunned by the
result and cannot understand how in America a court
could hold it is constitutional to punish an innocent
person. "This opinion comes as a tremendous shock
to me, too," Herpel added. "I fear this opinion may
unleash a terrible tyranny in this country. Forfeiture
has already been abused, and this opinion could lead
to even greater abuses."
Rehnquist's majority opinion was signed by
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The ruling was
a victory for Michigan and the Clinton
administration, which joined forces to preserve the
full impact of forfeiture laws. Such laws have
become a powerful law-enforcement weapon in the
war on drugs, alcohol abuse, prostitution and
gambling.
Supreme Court rulings in the 19th century
upheld seizures of vessels despite the innocence of
the owners. Later, the high court allowed boats and
cars to be seized, even though the owners were
unaware that their property was used to transport
drugs and liquor illegally.
In recent years, though, reports of flagrant
abuses led Congress to consider reform legislation
and the courts to become more skeptical. The
Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that forfeitures could
be challenged as an unconstitutionally excessive
fine. On Monday, Justice Stevens accused the court
of retreating from that decision.
The confiscation of an entire car "simply
because an illicit act took place once in the driver's
seat.. . is plainly excessive," said Stevens, who was
joined by David Souter and Stephen Breyer.
Anthony Kennedy dissented separately.
Copyright 1996 Knight Ridder Tribune
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CRITICS: FORFEITURE RULING CERTAIN TO SPUR REFORM
The National Law Journal, Volume 18, Number 29
Monday, March 18, 1996
Marcia Coyle
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent rejection of an
"innocent owner" defense to forfeiture actions will
have little practical impact in the law enforcement
field but could reinvigorate forfeiture reform efforts
on Capitol Hill, some experts say.
The high court's March 4 decision in Bennis v.
Michigan, 94-8729, surprised forfeiture proponents
and opponents. Until this term, the justices had
taken the lead in curbing government overreaching
in the forfeiture area through a series of decisions
that applied the Eighth Amendments excessive fines
clause to forfeitures and due process requirements
of notice and hearings.
The Bennis case was viewed by many as the
next big step by the high court - an opportunity to
protect the completely innocent owner of property
used by another for illegal purposes. Tina Bennis'
husband John had used their jointly owned 1977
Pontiac to pick up a prostitute in a Detroit suburb.
He was arrested for gross indecency after a police
officer saw him engaged in a sex act in the car's
front seat. The state sought to have the car forfeited
under a Michigan law that allows forfeiture of
buildings, vehicles, boats and aircraft used so as to
constitute a nuisance. Mrs. Bennis unsuccessfully
fought the forfeiture by arguing that she had no
knowledge her husband used the car to solicit a
prostitute.
In her high court appeal, Mrs. Bennis argued
that punishing someone who is blameless is a
violation of due process and that the forfeiture was
a taking without just compensation.
DIVIDED COURT
In a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, writing for the court, said a "long and
unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest
in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to
which the property is put even though the owner did
not known that it was to be put to such use." Those
cases, primarily drawn from admiralty law, are "too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced,"
he added.
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissent joined by
Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer,
said, "Fundamental fairness prohibits the
punishment of innocent people." Mrs. Bennis, he
said, was in no way negligent in her use or
entrustment of the family car. "Even assuming that
strict liability applies to 'innocent' owners, we have
consistently recognized an exception for truly
blameless individuals," he wrote.
The Bennis decision is "so out of touch with the
times and political currents that most prosecutors
are simply not going to take advantage of it," said
forfeiture expert David B. Smith, of English &
Smith, in Alexandria, Va. "They don't want to
because they know it's unfair and they don't want to
create a backlash that feeds the fires of reform. If
anything, the decision may have a positive impact;
it may energize the reform people on Capitol Hill."
The most disappointing aspect of the decision is
that it signals the high court, for whatever reason, is
no longer interested in forfeiture reform, said Mr.
Smith, author of a treatise on forfeiture. "They were
the leaders, but now it's a different court, and I have
no idea why."
Mrs. Bennis' high court counsel, Stefan B.
Herpel, of Ann Arbor, Mich., predicted that the
decision would generate more abuse "unless the
public demands that civil forfeiture be repealed, or
at least criminalized." Given how widely criticized
the decision has been, he added, "It can undermine
confidence in the court. The law, in its fundamental
sense, is made to protect innocent persons, and the
average man can't understand why the court has
abdicated its responsibility as guardian."
The decision is a setback, but not a major one,
added John J. Byrne, senior counsel at the American
Bankers Association, which filed an amicus brief
supporting Mrs. Bennis. There is reform activity at
the state level, he said, and the decision may revive
a dormant federal bill.
"I think it's encouraging the decision was 5-4
and no one suggested Mrs. Bennis had any
responsibility here," Mr. Byrne added. "We
consider ourselves innocent third parties. It could
happen to us."
Copyright 1996 by the New York Law Publishing
Company
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PROPERTY SEIZURE RULING SHOULD GIVE US PAUSE
The News Tribune, Tacoma, WA
Sunday, March 10, 1996
George Will, Syndicated Columnist
WASHINGTON - In 1827, in a case concerning
the forfeiture of a Spanish ship used for piracy,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the owner
could lose his ship even if he was not even aware
of the use of the ship for piracy: "The thing is
here primarily considered as the offender, or
rather the offense is attached primarily to the
thing." That, and a long line of cases in that vein,
is why the court says Tina Bennis has no right to
compensation for her half-interest in the car she
co-owned with her husband John and which was
forfeited after he was convicted in Detroit of
engaging in sexual activity with a prostitute in
the car.
The court was divided five to four in
rejecting Tina Bennis' contention that the
forfeiture violated her 14th Amendment right to
due process and her Fifth Amendment right not
to have property taken without just
compensation. Justice Stevens, joined in dissent
by Souter and Breyer (Kennedy dissented
separately), condemned the "blatant unfairness"
of punishing an innocent person.
And Justice Thomas, although concurring
separately in the opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and joined by O'Connor, Scalia,
Ginsburg and Thomas, said that what was done
to Tina Bennis by Michigan law was "intensely
undesirable."
Because many governments are increasingly
aggressive in their use of forfeiture as
punishment for prostitution, drug and other
offenses, this decision, although supported by the
most conservative justices, should trouble
conservatives. It involves conflicts among three
things they value - deference to states' legislative
judgments, fidelity to precedent and respect for
property rights.
John Bennis made his mistake in 1988 in an
11-year-old Pontiac he and his wife had recently
purchased for $600. The trial court judge had
discretion to order payment of half the sale
proceeds to "the innocent co-titleholder," but
commented that "there's practically nothing left"
after deduction of police, prosecutorial and court
costs. Justice Ginsburg noted that the question at
issue was not whether compensating Tina Bennis
would have been fair but whether compensation
was a constitutional right. And Ginsburg's
concurring opinion suggests that she would have
affirmed such a right had not the car belonged as
much to John Bennis as to Tina Bennis.
Although Tina Bennis neither consented to
nor knew of the misuse of the car, Rehnquist
cited the court's language in a 1926 case, that it
is common "for the law to visit upon the owner
of property the unpleasant consequences of the
unauthorized action of one to whom he has
entrusted it." That practice, the court had said
five years earlier, is "too firmly fixed in the
punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the
country to be now displaced."
Certainly the court should not casually
unsettle what it has firmly fixed. Nor should the
court relieve Congress of its role in correcting
dubious legal practices. The chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, Rep. Heny Hyde of
Illinois, has drafted the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act that would, among other things,
strengthen protection of innocent property
owners.
Still, sometimes the court has had to say, in
effect, "Well, come to think about it. .. ." It took
four years of carnage and then the 13th
Amendment to correct what the court did in
1857 inDredScottv. Sanford. But in other cases
the court has tidied up after itself.
In 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson the court held
that "separate but equal" public facilities
segregated by race were compatible with the
14th Amendments guarantee of equal protection
of the laws. Later, the court conducted a
protracted retreat from that position.
In 1905 in Lochner v. New York, as in similar
cases, the court held that a New York law
limiting bakers to a 10-hour workday violated
the Due Process clause. By 1963 Justice Hugo
Black could assert that the Lochner doctrine of
"substantive due process," that the court can
overturn laws it considers unwise, "has long
since been discarded." (Actually, it has long
since been smuggled into liberal jurisprudence to
support a different social policy agenda.)
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In his obviously uneasy concurring opinion
in the court's decision about Tina Bennis' car,
Justice Thomas says the case "is ultimately a
reminder that the federal Constitution does not
prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable."
Quite so. So it is time for the political branches
of state governments and the federal government
to act on the clear signals from Thomas and
others concerning the need to protect innocent
persons who cannot reasonably be considered
culpably negligent concerning the misuse of their
property.
(George Will, a Ph.D. graduate of Oxford and
former professor of political philosophy, is a
columnist for The Washington Post.)
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GIWE AND TAKE ON TAKINGS
High Court Approves of Stealing Property From Innocent People
The Charleston Gazette
Monday, April 15, 1996
Charles Levendosky
The Supreme Court has given its stamp of
approval to states that steal property from innocent
people.
Such a forfeiture doesn't violate the
constitutional protections of due process, the high
court said.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the
decision last week for a 5-to-4 majority in the
Bennis vs. Michigan case.
The chief justice writes opinions as if he were
writing algebraic formulas - they make no reference
to the lives they affect.
Bloodless. Callous. And in this case, brutally
wrong-headed.
Tina Bennis sued the state of Michigan to
recover her half-interest in the 1977 Pontiac that
was seized when Detroit police caught her husband
in the car having sex with a prostitute.
The state declared the Pontiac a public nuisance
and "abated' it - meaning the state sold the car and
kept the proceeds.
Tina Bennis claims she was an innocent party.
She testified that she had no idea her husband was
going to use the car to have sex. If she had known,
could she have stopped him? How?
If she had called the police, would they have
done anything prior to the misdemeanor? I doubt it.
Detroit police have more to do than to follow a
"potential" John.
Tightwad Michigan couldn't spring for half the
sale of the Pontiac they confiscated and then sold.
They could have given Tina Bennis the trivial
amount to cover her half ownership. What might
that have been - $400, more or less?
The state said the sale of the old car just
covered the court costs of the civil forfeiture action
the prosecutor took against the car.
Instead the state paid its attorneys and paid for
the enormous paperwork to go through years of
appeals when Tina appealed. Years. People in the
real world - except, apparently, the chief justice -
know why.
So the state can continue to steal property from
the innocent.
The high court just issued Michigan and other
states a license for theft.
The majority opinion rests its argument on
precedence - on "a long and unbroken line of cases,"
according to the court, dating back to Justice Story's
opinion in 1827.
That case dealt with the forfeiture of the
privateer, the Palmyra, which had been
commissioned by the King of Spain. It attacked a
U.S. vessel and was later captured. The high court
held that "the thing is here primarily considered as
the offender, or rather the offence is attached
primarily to the thing."
The U.S. military could hardly have seized the
King of Spain or the owner of the privateer,
therefore, it seized the vessel.
So, the chief justice reasons, the Pontiac is the
thing. Seize the Pontiac.
But the state of Michigan caught the man who
committed the misdemeanor.
Nevertheless, using the car once in such an act
makes it a "public nuisance' and thus subject to
forfeiture.
Would a motel used for sex with a prostitute be
subject to forfeiture? Suppose Mr. Bennis had taken
the woman to his home when he wife was absent,
would Tina Bennis lose half-ownership in her home,
too? The chief justice wouldn't seem to have a
problem with that.
What does a sex act in a car have to do with a
privateer that attacks a U.S. vessel? What does
admiralty law have to do with a car parked on a
Detroit street?
Tina Bennis didn't commission her husband to
go out with their car and have sex with a prostitute.
So what is the legal connection?
Ask Chief Justice Rehnquist. He wrote the
archaic formula.
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin
Scalia joined the majority opinion without comment.
269
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring
opinion that in effect apologizes for the decision -
yet supports it.
Don't worry, she assures us, Michigan's
nuisance abatement law is fair and "the state's
Supreme Court stands ready to police exorbitant
applications of the statute."
Justice Ginsburg seeks to mollify outraged
citizens who might be concerned for their
constitutional rights.
She continued, "Michigan, in short, has not
embarked on an experiment to punish innocent third
parties. Nor do we condone any such experiment."
She ends her concurrence by saying Michigan is
only trying "to deter Johns from using cars" to
contribute to the "blight" of prostitution.
Is it deterrence to take property away from an
innocent wife of that John?
So much for property rights and for the innocent
victims of greedy law enforcement officials.
Justice Clarence Thomas agreed. "This case is
ultimately a reminder that the federal Constitution
does not prohibit everything that is intensely
undesirable," he wrote in his concurring opinion.
More revealing, he wrote "The limits on what
property can be forfeited as a result of wrongdoing
- for example, what it means to 'use' property in a
crime for purposes of forfeiture laws - are not clear
to me."
Justice Thomas apparently hated it, isn't clear
about it, yet he voted to deny Tina Bennis her half of
the worth of the old Pontiac.
His motto: When in doubt, vote against
innocence.
The amount of money involved may be
insignificant, but the principle here remains one of
great consequence: Should a state be allowed to
confiscate property without due process of law?
This is one of the most abysmal decisions to
come of this court in years.
It smacks of rigid thinking and a dismal
kowtowing to law enforcement.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, which
Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer joined.
Justice Stevens points out that the 1977 Pontiac isn't
contraband, isn't a weapon, and isn't an instrument
of crime, like burglar's tools - and shouldn't have
been subject to forfeiture.
He ends his dissenting opinion by calling the
seizure blatantly unfair and unconstitutional.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, in his
one-and-a-half-page dissent, wrote curtly, "This
forfeiture cannot meet the requirements of due
process."
Nonetheless, a majority of the court with weak
and perfidious arguments supported a ruling that
will undoubtedly impact the lives of many innocent
citizens.
Sadly, the high court might have used this case
to restrain the runaway use of property seizures by
law enforcement officials.
No, Tina, there is no justice regarding forfeiture
laws. And apparently there won't be until the
Supreme Court gets a new chief.
(Levendosky is the editorial page editor for the
Casper (Wyo.) Star-Tribune.)
Distributed by The New York Times.
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Tina B. BENNIS, Petitioner,
V.
MICHIGAN.
Supreme Court of the United States
116 S. Ct. 994
Argued Nov. 29, 1995.
Decided March 4, 1996.
Rehearing Denied April 22, 1996.
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was ajoint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her husband engaged in sexual
activity with a prostitute. A Michigan court ordered the automobile forfeited as a public nuisance, with no
offset for her interest, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband's activity. We hold that the
Michigan court order did not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged in a sexual act with a prostitute in the
automobile while it was parked on a Detroit city street. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency. The State
then sued both Bennis and his wife, petitioner Tina B. Bennis, to have the car declared a public nuisance and
abated as such under §§ 600.3801 and 600.3825 of Michigan's Compiled Laws.
Petitioner defended against the abatement of her interest in the car on the ground that, when she entrusted
her husband to use the car, she did not know that he would use it to violate Michigan's indecency law. The
Wayne County Circuit Court rejected this argument, declared the car a public nuisance, and ordered the car's
abatement. In reaching this disposition, the trial court judge recognized the remedial discretion he had under
Michigan's case law. He took into account the couple's ownership of "another automobile," so they would
not be left "without transportation." He also mentioned his authority to order the payment of one-half of the
sale proceeds, after the deduction of costs, to "the innocent co-title holder." He declined to order such a
division of sale proceeds in this case because of the age and value of the car (an 1 1-year-old Pontiac sedan
recently purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600); he commented in this regard: "[T]here's practically
nothing left minus costs in a situation such as this."
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed...
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement in its entirety.
[The court then announced that, in order to abate an owner's interest in a vehicle, Michigan does not need
to prove that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be used in a manner proscribed by § 600.3801
when she entrusted it to another user. The court next addressed petitioner's federal constitutional challenges
to the State's abatement scheme: The court assumed that petitioner did not know of or consent to the misuse
of the Bennis car, and concluded, in light of our decisions in Van Oster v. Kansas and Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., that Michigan's failure to provide an innocent-owner defense was "without
constitutional consequence." The Michigan Supreme Court specifically noted that, in its view, an owner's
interest may not be abated when "a vehicle is used without the owner's consent." Furthermore, the court
confirmed the trial court's description of the nuisance abatement proceeding as an "equitable action," and
considered it "critical" that the trial judge so comprehended the statute.
We granted certiorari in order to determine whether Michigan's abatement scheme has deprived petitioner
of her interest in the forfeited car without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or has
taken her interest for public use without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated
by the Fourteenth Amendment. We affirm.
The gravamen of petitioner's due process claim is not that she was denied notice or an opportunity to
contest the abatement of her car; she was accorded both. Rather, she claims she was entitled to contest the
abatement by showing she did not know her husband would use it to violate Michigan's indecency law. But
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a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the
use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use.
Our earliest opinion to this effect is Justice Story's opinion for the Court in The Palmyra (1827). The
Palmyra, which had been commissioned as a privateer by the King of Spain and had attacked a United States
vessel, was captured by a United States war ship and brought into Charleston, South Carolina, for
adjudication. On the Government's appeal from the Circuit Court's acquittal of the vessel, it was contended
by the owner that the vessel could not be forfeited until he was convicted for the privateering. The Court
rejected this contention, explaining: "The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the
offence is attached primarily to the thing". . . .
"It is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant
consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he has entrusted it".....
The dissent argues that our cases treat contraband differently from instrumentalities used to convey
contraband, like cars: Objects in the former class are forfeitable "however blameless or unknowing their
owners may be," but with respect to an instrumentality in the latter class, an owner's innocence is no defense
only to the "principal use being made of that property." However, this Court's precedent has never made the
due process inquiry depend on whether the use for which the instrumentality was forfeited was the principal
use. If it had, perhaps cases like Calero-Toledo, in which Justice Douglas noted in dissent that there was
no showing that the "yacht had been notoriously used in smuggling drugs ... and so far as we know only one
marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht," might have been decided differently.
The dissent also suggests that The Palmyra line of cases "would justify the confiscation of an ocean linerjust because one of its passengers sinned while on board." None of our cases have held that an ocean liner
may be confiscated because of the activities of one passenger. We said in Goldsmith-Grant, and we repeat
here, that "[w]hen such application shall be made it will be time enough to pronounce upon it."
Notwithstanding this well-established authority rejecting the innocent-owner defense, petitioner argues
that we should in effect overrule it by importing a culpability requirement from cases having at best a
tangential relation to the "innocent owner" doctrine in forfeiture cases. She cites Foucha v. Louisiana, for
the proposition that a criminal defendant may not be punished for a crime if he is found to be not guilty. She
also argues that our holding in Austin v. United States, that the Excessive Fines Clause limits the scope of
civil forfeiture judgments, "would be difficult to reconcile with any rule allowing truly innocent persons to
be punished by civil forfeiture". . . .
.... But, putting aside the extent to which a forfeiture proceeding is "punishment" in the first place, Foucha
did not purport to discuss, let alone overrule, The Palmyra line of cases.
In Austin, the Court held that because "forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner," forfeiture
proceedings are subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines.
There was no occasion in that case to deal with the validity of the "innocent-owner defense," other than to
point out that if a forfeiture statute allows such a defense, the defense is additional evidence that the statute
itself is "punitive" in motive. In this case, however, Michigan's Supreme Court emphasized with respect to
the forfeiture proceeding at issue: "It is not contested that this is an equitable action," in which the trial judge
has discretion to consider "alternatives [to] abating the entire interest in the vehicle."
In any event, for the reasons pointed out in Calero-Toledo and Van Oster, forfeiture also serves a
deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose. Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses "both by
preventing further illicit use of the [property] and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal
behavior unprofitable." This deterrent mechanism is hardly unique to forfeiture.
Petitioner also claims that the forfeiture in this case was a taking of private property for public use in
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. But if the forfeiture proceeding here in question did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
the property in the automobile was transferred by virtue of that proceeding from petitioner to the State. The
government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired
under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain.
At bottom, petitioner's claims depend on an argument that the Michigan forfeiture statute is unfair
because it relieves prosecutors from the burden of separating co-owners who are complicit in the wrongful
use of property from innocent co-owners. This argument, in the abstract, has considerable appeal, as we
acknowledged in Goldsmith-Grant. Its force is reduced in the instant case, however, by the Michigan
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Supreme Court's confirmation of the trial court's remedial discretion and petitioner's recognition that
Michigan may forfeit her and her husband's car whether or not she is entitled to an offset for her interest in
it.
We conclude today, as we concluded 75 years ago, that the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue
are "too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced." The
State here sought to deter illegal activity that contributes to neighborhood deterioration and unsafe streets.
The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated and was used in criminal activity. Both the trial court and
the Michigan Supreme Court followed our longstanding practice, and the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Michigan is therefore affirmed.
Justice THOMAS, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court....
As the Court notes, evasion of the normal requirement of proof before punishment might well seem
"unfair." One unaware of the history of forfeiture laws and 200 years of this Court's precedent regarding such
laws might well assume that such a scheme is lawless--a violation of due process....
This case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is
intensely undesirable. As detailed in the Court's opinion and the cases cited therein, forfeiture of property
without proof of the owner's wrongdoing, merely because it was "used" in or was an "instrumentality" of
crime has been permitted in England and this country, both before and after the adoption of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments....
Improperly used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from
innocent but hapless owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who
associate with criminals, than a component of a system ofjustice. When the property sought to be forfeited
has been entrusted by its owner to one who uses it for crime, however, the Constitution apparently assigns
to the States and to the political branches of the Federal Government the primary responsibility for avoiding
that result.
Justice GINSBURG, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court and highlight features of the case key to myjudgment. The dissenting
opinions target a law scarcely resembling Michigan's "red light abatement" prescription, as interpreted by
the State's courts. First, it bears emphasis that the car in question belonged to John Bennis as much as it did
to Tina Bennis. At all times he had her consent to use the car, just as she had his. And it is uncontested that
Michigan may forfeit the vehicle itself. The sole question, then, is whether Tina Bennis is entitled not to the
car, but to a portion of the proceeds (if any there be after deduction of police, prosecutorial, and court costs)
as a matter of constitutional right....
[T]he State's Supreme Court stands ready to police exorbitant applications of the statute. It shows no
respect for Michigan's high court to attribute to its members tolerance of, or insensitivity to, inequitable
administration of an "equitable action."
Nor is it fair to charge the trial court with "blatant unfairness" in the case at hand. That court declined
to order a division of sale proceeds, as the trial judge took pains to explain, for two practical reasons: the
Bennises have "another automobile,"; and the age and value of the forfeited car (an 1 1-year-old Pontiac
purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600) left "practically nothing" to divide after subtraction of costs.
Michigan, in short, has not embarked on an experiment to punish innocent third parties. Nor do we
condone any such experiment. Michigan has decided to deter Johns from using cars they own (or co-own)
to contribute to neighborhood blight, and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this Court's
disapprobation.
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER and Justice BREYER join, dissenting....
The logic of the Court's analysis would permit the States to exercise virtually unbridled power to
confiscate vast amounts of property where professional criminals have engaged in illegal acts. Some airline
passengers have marijuana cigarettes in their luggage; some hotel guests are thieves; some spectators at
professional sports events carry concealed weapons; and some hitchhikers are prostitutes. The State surely
may impose strict obligations on the owners of airlines, hotels, stadiums, and vehicles to exercise a high
degree of care to prevent others from making illegal use of their property, but neither logic nor history
supports the Court's apparent assumption that their complete innocence imposes no constitutional
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impediment to the seizure of their property simply because it provided the locus for a criminal
transaction....
The State attempts to characterize this forfeiture as serving exclusively remedial, as opposed to punitive
ends, because its goal was to abate what the State termed a "nuisance." Even if the State were correct, that
argument would not rebut the excessiveness of the forfeiture, which I have discussed above. But in any
event, there is no serious claim that the confiscation in this case was not punitive. The majority itself
concedes that " 'forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.' " At an earlier stage of this litigation,
the State unequivocally argued that confiscation of automobiles in the circumstances of this case "is swift
and certain 'punishment' of the voluntary vice consumer." Therefore, the idea that this forfeiture did not
punish petitioner's husband--and, a fortiori, petitioner herself--is simply not sustainable.
Even judged in isolation, the remedial interest in this forfeiture falls far short of that which we have found
present in other cases. Forfeiture may serve remedial ends when removal of certain items (such as a burglar's
tools) will prevent repeated violations of the law (such as housebreaking). But confiscating petitioner's car
does not disable her husband from using other venues for similar illegal rendezvous, since all that is needed
to commit this offense is a place. The remedial rationale is even less convincing according to the State's
"nuisance" theory, for that theory treats the car as a nuisance only so long as the illegal event is occurring and
only so long as the car is located in the relevant neighborhood. The need to "abate" the car thus disappears
the moment it leaves the area. In short, therefore, a remedial justification simply does not apply to a
confiscation of this type.
Apart from the lack of a sufficient nexus between petitioner's car and the offense her husband committed,
I would reverse because petitioner is entirely without responsibility for that act. Fundamental fairness
prohibits the punishment of innocent people.
The majority insists that it is a settled rule that the owner of property is strictly liable for wrongful uses
to which that property is put. Only three Terms ago, however, the Court surveyed the same historical
antecedents and held that all of its forfeiture decisions rested "at bottom, on the notion that the owner has
been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that negligence."
According to Austin, even the hoary fiction that property was forfeitable because of its own guilt was based
on the idea that " 'such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is
properly punished by the forfeiture.' " It is conceded that petitioner was in no way negligent in her use or
entrustment of the family car. Thus, no forfeiture should have been permitted. The majority, however,
simply ignores Austin 's detailed analysis of our case law without explanation or comment.
Even assuming that strict liability applies to "innocent" owners, we have consistently recognized an
exception for truly blameless individuals. The Court's opinion in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co. established the proposition that the Constitution bars the punitive forfeiture of property when its owner
alleges and proves that he took all reasonable steps to prevent its illegal use. The majority dismisses this
statement as "obiter dictum," but we have assumed that such a principle existed, or expressly reserved the
question, in a line of cases dating back nearly 200 years. In other contexts, we have regarded as axiomatic
that persons cannot be punished when they have done no wrong. I would hold now what we have always
assumed: that the principle is required by due process.
The unique facts of this case demonstrate that petitioner is entitled to the protection of that rule. The
subject of this forfeiture was certainly not contraband. It was not acquired with the proceeds of criminal
activity and its principal use was entirely legitimate. It was an ordinary car that petitioner's husband used
to commute to the steel mill where he worked. Petitioner testified that they had been married for nine years;
that she had acquired her ownership interest in the vehicle by the expenditure of money that she had earned
herself; that she had no knowledge of her husband's plans to do anything with the car except "come directly
home from work," as he had always done before; and that she even called "Missing Persons" when he failed
to return on the night in question. Her testimony is not contradicted and certainly is credible. Without
knowledge that he would commit such an act in the family car, or that he had ever done so previously, surely
petitioner cannot be accused of failing to take "reasonable steps" to prevent the illicit behavior. She is just
as blameless as if a thief, rather than her husband, had used the car in a criminal episode.
While the majority admits that this forfeiture is at least partly punitive in nature, it asserts that
Michigan's law also serves a"deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose." But that is no distinction
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at all; deterrence is itself one of the aims of punishment. Even on a deterrence rationale, moreover, that goal
is not fairly served in the case of a person who has taken all reasonable steps to prevent an illegal act....
The absence of any deterrent value reinforces the punitive nature of this forfeiture law. But petitioner
has done nothing that warrants punishment. She cannot be accused of negligence or of any other dereliction
in allowing her husband to use the car for the wholly legitimate purpose of transporting himself to and from
his job. She affirmatively alleged and proved that she is not in any way responsible for the conduct that gave
rise to the seizure. If anything, she was a victim of that conduct. In my opinion, these facts establish that
the seizure constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law.....
While I am not prepared to draw a bright line that will separate the permissible and impermissible
forfeitures of the.property of innocent owners, I am convinced that the blatant unfairness of this seizure
places it on the unconstitutional side of that line. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Justice KENNEDY, dissenting....
This forfeiture cannot meet the requirements of due process. Nothing in the rationale of the Michigan
Supreme Court indicates that the forfeiture turned on the negligence or complicity of petitioner, or a
presumption thereof, and nothing supports the suggestion that the value of her co-ownership is so
insignificant as to be beneath the law's protection. For these reasons, and with all respect, I dissent.
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95-9075 HENDRICKS v. KANSAS
Sexual predators-Double jeopardy-Ex post
facto laws-Equal protection.
Ruling below (Kan SupCt, 912 P.2d 129, 58
CrL 1513):
Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act, Kan.
Stat. Ann. Section 59-29a01 et seq., which pro-
vides for civil commitment and long-term care
and treatment of person who is found beyond
reasonable doubt both to be suffering from men-
tal abnormality that has resulted in that person's
commission of sexually violent offense and to
present continuing danger to society through like-
lihood of repeating such offenses, violates sub-
stantive component of Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, as interpreted in Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 60 LW 4359 (1992), by
failing to require that person sought to be con-
fined have mental illness; "mental abnormality,"
as defined in statute, is not equivalent to mental
illness; defendant's claims that act violates consti-
tutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and
ex post facto laws and fails to provide equal
protection need not be addressed.
Questions presented: (1) Is Kansas law provid-
ing for long-term, indefinite confinement of sex-
ually violent predators, even though labeled civil
proceeding, so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to require that it must be considered criminal?
(2) Does Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act
violate constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy? (3) Does Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act violate constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws? (4) Does. Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act fail to provide
equal protection under law as guaranteed by
Constitution?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/13/96, by Thom-
as J. Weilert, of Wichita, Kan.
95-1649 KANSAS v. HENDRICKS
Mental patients-Commitment of "sexually vio-lent predators"-Substantive due process.
Ruling below (Kan SupCt, 912 P.2d 129, 58
CrL 1513):
Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act, Kan.
Stat. Ann. Section 59-29a01 et seq., which pro-
vides for civil commitment and long-term care
and treatment of person who is found beyond
reasonable doubt both to be suffering from men-
tal abnormality that has resulted in that person's
commission of sexually violent offense and to
F resent continuing danger to society through like-ihood of repeating such offenses, violates sub-
stantive component of Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, as interpreted in Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 60 LW 4359 (1992), byfailing to require that person sought to be con-fined have mental illness; "mental abnormality,"
as defined in statute, is not equivalent to mental
illness.
Questions presented: (1) Does Kansas' Sexual-
ly Violent Predator Act violate substantive due
process principles? (2) What level of constitution-
al scrutiny applies to claim that civil confinement
of sexually violent predator for care and treat-
ment deprives such persons of liberty interest in
violation of substantive due process principles?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/12/96, by CarlaJ. Stovall, Kan. Atty. Gen., Stephen R. McAllis-
ter, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Bernard Nash,
James vanR. Springer, Laura B. Feigin, and
Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin L.L.P., all of Wash-
ington, D.C.
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SEXUAL-PREDATOR CASE FROM KANSAS WILL GUIDE NATION
The Kansas City Star
Tuesday, June 18, 1996
Tony Rizzo, Staff Writer
The U.S. Supreme Court announced Monday
that it would use a Kansas case to decide the
constitutionality of sexual-predator laws throughout
the country. The 2-year-old Kansas law, which the
state's high court ruled unconstitutional in March, is
the first of its kind to be addressed by the U.S. high
court.
Sexual-predator laws generally allow officials to
imprison certain offenders indefinitely if they have
mental problems that make them likely to offend
again. The Kansas law is applied even after an
offender finishes a prison sentence.
Critics say such laws unfairly punish people
twice for the same crime and incarcerate them for
crimes they may never commit. Proponents,
however, say the laws protect society from
dangerous repeat offenders while providing
treatment for them.
Officials from 34 states and territories joined
Kansas in asking the high court to address the law,
said Kansas Attorney General Carla Stovall. State
supreme courts have so far been split on the
constitutionality of the laws. "This whole area
is not going to settle down until the U.S. Supreme
Court tells us yea or nay," said Johnson County
District Attorney Paul Morrison.
Nancy Orrick, an Olathe lawyer who opposed
Morrison in the county's first predator case, agreed.
"Ultimately, this is a decision they are going to
have to make," she said. "Everybody has known that
from day one."
The supreme courts in Washington and
Wisconsin have found predator laws to be
constitutional, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
upheld that state's law. The Kansas law was
modeled on the state of Washington's statute, which
has been in effect since 1990.
The Kansas Legislature passed the law in the
wake of the murder of Stephanie Schmidt, a
Pittsburg State University student. She was killed by
a sex offender who had been released from prison.
Her parents, Peggy and Gene Schmidt of Leawood,
are strong advocates of the law. "We think it's a
good law and should stand up to the constitutional
challenge, " Gene Schmidt said.
Seven men in Kansas have been found to be
predators under the law. They are being held in
maximum security at the Lamed Correctional
Mental Health Facility. By law they must be kept
separate from other inmates. Monday's action means
that they will be kept in custody until the U.S.
Supreme Court rules.
Kansas officials also said they would continue
to file predator actions. One was filed Friday in
Johnson County against an Olathe man, Jerry
Inman, who was to be released from prison in July.
A predator case is pending against Michael Abrams,
a Leawood man who was scheduled to be released
from prison in March. Abrams and Inman are being
held in the Johnson County Jail. Inman's attorney,
Robert Morse, said he would go forward with the
case while the appeal progresses. A hearing for
Inman is July 11. Abrams' attorney, Loren Moll,
said Monday's decision was disappointing because
it prevented Abrams from going free.
The first man in the state committed under the
law, Leroy Hendricks of Wichita, brought the appeal
that led the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. His
attorney, Tom Weilert, raised many constitutional
issues in the appeal, but the Kansas Supreme Court
in its March 1 decision ruled on only one. The court
voted 4-3 that the law violated the due process
clause to the 14th Amendment of the Constitution.
The majority ruled that the predator law
contradicted a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case that
said people cannot be committed involuntarily
unless they are found to be both mentally ill and
dangerous. Under the Kansas law predators do not
have to found to be mentally ill; they must only
suffer a personality disorder or a mental
abnormality.
Stovall appealed the Kansas court's decision to
the U.S. court, and Weilert asked the court to
address all of the constitutional issues, not just the
one decided by the Kansas court. In Monday's
announcement the court agreed to address all the
issues. "I think it's going to be real interesting,"
Weilert said. "It will encompass a lot of important
constitutional issues."
Some of the issues Weilert raised include claims
that the law constitutes double jeopardy and that it
is applied retroactively, to offenders who were
convicted before the law was passed. Stovall said
she planned to argue the case for the state. Weilert
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said he had not decided whether he would argue the the fall or the winter. A Supreme Court clerk said a
case. schedule of argument dates would be released in
Both sides have 45 days to file briefs. They then mid-July. Attorneys estimated that a decision could
have an additional 30 days to answer each other's come six to eight weeks after oral arguments.
briefs. Oral arguments probably will take place in The Kansas City Star Copyright 1996
278
HOLDING OF VIOLENT SEX OFFENDER
WHO SEEMS LIKELY TO REPEAT CRIMES WILL BE ARGUED
The New York Times
June 18, 1996
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON: The Supreme Court agreed today
to decide whether a state can continue to-confine a
violent sexual offender who is considered likely to
repeat his crimes, but who has served his sentence
and does not meet the ordinary criteria for being
committed as mentally ill.
The case, an appeal by the State of Kansas,
reaches the Court at a time of growing concern over
how the legal system should handle sexual predators
who continue to present a danger beyond the
immediate reach of the criminal justice system. Last
month, President Clinton signed a new Federal law
requiring the states to notify localities when a
convicted sex offender settles nearby.
The Supreme Court case grows out of a
different, and increasingly popular, approach to the
same problem. The Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act, which the State Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional earlier this year, requires
civil commitment in a mental hospital for a sex
offender who has served his sentence and is then
found by a jury in a separate proceeding to be still
dangerous and suffering from a "mental
abnormality" that has resulted in his criminal
behavior. The continued confinement is open-ended,
with re-evaluation every year.
Arizona, California, Minnesota, Washington
and Wisconsin have similar laws, which are in
various phases of legal challenges. The Wisconsin
and Washington laws have been upheld by those
states' Supreme Courts. But in the Washington State
case, a Federal District Court subsequently ruled the
law unconstitutional in a habeas corpus proceeding
that the state has appealed.
Washington was the first state to enact such a
law, in 1990. Kansas enacted its law in 1994. Other
states have been paying close attention, and New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut joined 30 other
states in signing a brief urging the Justices to hear
the Kansas appeal.
The Kansas Supreme Court, dividing 4 to 3 in
a challenge brought by a 60-year-old man being held
in a state hospital for the criminally insane, ruled
that the law violated the constitutional guarantee of
due process, as defined by the United States
Supreme Court in a 1992 decision. In that ruling,
Foucha v. Louisiana, the Justices held that once a
person found not guilty by reason of insanity is no
longer mentally ill, the state may no longer confine
him.
The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that
because the phrase "mental abnormality" was not an
accepted psychiatric diagnosis, the sexual predator
law impermissibly operated to confine people who
were not mentally ill. The court noted that the state
could, without a constitutional problem, increase
criminal sentences for sex crimes and insure through
long sentences that dangerous offenders would not
be released.
The defendant in this case, Leroy Hendricks,
has been convicted of a series of sex crimes against
young children beginning in 1955 and has served
about half the time since then in prison or mental
hospitals. He has committed new crimes every time
he has been released. In August 1994, as his latest
sentence was ending, the state sought his
commitment under the new law, and after hearing
psychiatric testimony during a three-day trial, ajury
found that he was likely to pry upon young children
again if he was released.
This spring, the Supreme Court granted a stay
permitting continued confinement of Mr. Hendricks
and five other men after the Kansas Supreme Court
struck down the law. The case, Kansas v.
HendricksNo. 95-1649, will be argued in the fall.
Copyright 1996 The New York Times Company
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SEXUAL PREDATOR LAW IN KANSAS IS STRUCK DOWN
The Kansas City Star
Saturday, March 2, 1996
Tony Rizzo, Staff Writer
The Kansas Supreme Court on Friday struck
down the state's 2-year-old sexual predator law in a
split decision that reflected the law's controversial
nature. By a 4-3 vote, the court found that the law is
unconstitutional because it indefinitely commits
sexual offenders who are not mentally ill.
The decision means Leroy Hendricks, a Wichita
man with a 40-year history of child molestation who
brought the appeal, and the six other men confined
under the law could soon go free. "The hard fact is
that sometimes we make decisions we do not like,"
Justice Tyler Lockett wrote for the majority. "We
make them because they are right, right in the sense
that the law and the Constitution as we see them
compels the result."
Attorney General Carla Stovall vowed to appeal
the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court and said she
will ask the Kansas court to hold up the men's
release while the decision is being appealed. "I'm
certainly disappointed that the U.S. Constitution
was construed in a way that doesn't allow the state
of Kansas to adequately protect the public from
these offenders," she said.
The law, which took effect in April 1994, was
designed to keep the state's most dangerous sex
offenders locked up for treatment even after they
completed prison sentences. Critics have
complained the men were being "warehoused," not
treated, and that the law unfairly punished the men
twice for the same crime. The law applies to
offenders who suffer a personality disorder or
mental abnormality that makes them likely to
commit future acts of predatory sexual violence.
By definition, they were people who did not
qualify as being mentally ill. If they were mentally
ill, they could have been confined under existing
state law pertaining to involuntary mental
commitments. And that's the problem, the court
ruled Friday.
Justices cited a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case
that says a person cannot be committed against his
will unless it is shown he is both mentally ill and
dangerous. As a result, the predator law violates the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment, the
Kansas court ruled.
But the three dissenters in Friday's decision said
Kansas should follow the lead of the supreme courts
of Washington state and Wisconsin, which upheld
nearly identical laws. They quoted the Washington
Supreme Court in their dissent:
"It is irrefutable that the state has a
compelling interest both in treating sex
predators and protecting society from their
actions."
They were agreeing with the majority of the
Washington court, even though that court's decision
has since been overturned by a federal judge.
Justice Edward Larson said there were a number
of differences between the Kansas law and the
Louisiana statute ruled on in the earlier U.S.
Supreme Court decision.
Seven men are currently committed as sexual
predators in the Lamed Correctional Mental Health
Facility. In each case, ajury found them to be sexual
predators. The law allows them to petition the court
for release on a yearly basis. They can be held until
doctors determine they are no longer likely to
re-offend.
One case, filed last week in Johnson County, is
pending. Johnson County District Attorney Paul
Morrison said Friday's decision means that the case
against Michael L. Abrams probably will have to be
dropped. Abrams, who has twice been convicted of
sex crimes involving children, is scheduled to be
paroled after March 19.
Another Johnson County man, Kenneth Hay,
was ruled to be a sexual predator in April 1995. He
was about to be released after serving several years
in prison for exposing himself to children.
In October 1994, Hendricks became the first
person committed under the law. His attorney, who
argued the case in front of the Supreme Court in
September, was pleased by the decision Friday.
"This restores my faith in the overall judicial
process," Tom Weilert said. He agreed with the
justices that the state has other ways of dealing with
such offenders.
Hendricks could have received a maximum
sentence of 45 to 180 years when he was prosecuted
in Sedgwick County in 1984, Weilert said. But in a
plea agreement, Hendricks received a
five-to-20-year sentence.
"Without violating the Constitution, the state
could have incarcerated Hendricks until he exhaled
280
his last breath and his spirit departed the earth, but
it did not," Lockett wrote.
The Kansas Legislature is now considering
legislation that would significantly increase prison
sentences for repeat sex offenders.
"It becomes all the more important now,"
Stovall said Friday.
The Washington legislature on Thursday passed
a similar measure, according to Todd Bowers, an
assistant Washington attorney general. The Kansas
predator law was based on Washington's, which
went into effect in 1990.
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the law
in 1993, but last summer a federal judge found the
law unconstitutional on the same grounds used by
the Kansas court Friday. The Washington attorney
general is now appealing to the U.S. Court of
Appeals. Bowers said that either way the appeals
court rules, the law probably will reach the U.S.
Supreme Court. "The Supreme Court has never
defined what mentally ill is," he said.
Missouri legislators also are considering a
sexual predator measure. Officials have attempted
to structure it so they won't see the problems the
Kansas and Washington laws have encountered, said
Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon. "We feel that
the framework of our measure is much more
constitutionally defendable," Nixon said.
Kansas Sen. Robert Vancrunm, an Overland Park
Republican and a major sponsor of the sexual
predator law, said he was disappointed but not
surprised by the Kansas court's decision.
"When Washington's law was found
unconstitutional we thought we might have a
problem," he said. The legislature now has two
options, Vancrum said. In addition to looking at
stiffer penalties, it could look at ways to amend the
predator law.
Morrison said the legislature needs to carefully
consider any possible changes in the law. "We need
something that will serve the public and be
constitutionally sound," he said. Morrison said it is
an important enough concern that some action will
be taken. "This issue not dead," he said.
The Kansas City Star Copyright 1996
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In the Matter of the
CARE AND TREATMENT of Leroy HENDRICKS, Appellant.
912 P.2d 129
Supreme Court of Kansas.
March 1, 1996.
Stay Granted April 22, 1996.
ALLEGRUCCI, Justice:
Leroy Hendricks appeals from a jury finding that he is a sexually violent predator as defined in the
Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act), K.S.A. 59- 29 aO 1 et seq., and from the district court's order of
commitment, which was issued pursuant to that finding. The Act establishes a procedure, which is stated
to be civil, for involuntarily committing sexually violent predators for long-term care and treatment.
Hendricks challenges the constitutionality of the Act and also raises various other grounds for reversing the
finding and order of the district court.
This case was initiated by the district attorney's filing on August 17, 1994, of a petition in the district
court seeking commitment of Leroy Hendricks as a sexually violent predator under the Act. The petition
recited that it anticipated Hendricks' release from confinement on September 11, 1994, and stated
[Hendricks'] criminal history...
The petition further alleged that Hendricks "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence."
At the time the petition was filed, Hendricks was serving a sentence of 5 to 20 years imprisonment. The
sentence had been imposed in accordance with the State's recommendation pursuant to a plea agreement ...
A jury trial was conducted October 3-5, 1994. Hendricks was called as a witness by the State. He
testified that he was 60 years old, that his history of sexual involvement with children began with his
exposing himself to two girls in 1955, and that he had spent approximately half the time since then in prison
or in psychiatric institutions. He explained that when he gets "stressed out," he is unable to control the urge
to engage in sexual activity with a child. Hendricks agreed that he is a pedophile and that he is not cured
of the condition.
The State also called Charles Befort, the chief psychologist at Lamed State Hospital. He testified that
a pedophile is predisposed to commit sexual acts with children and that pedophilia in and of itself is not
considered to be a personality disorder. Dr. Befort testified that during the previous week he had performed
an evaluation of Hendricks. Dr. Befort believed it likely that Hendricks would engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence or sexual activity with children if permitted to do so. The factors upon which he based this
opinion were the aphorism that "behavior is a good predictor of future behavior," his professional knowledge
that pedophiles tend to repeat their behavior, and Hendricks' poor understanding of his behavior. He testified
that he did not believe Hendricks was mentally ill or had a personality disorder but that, as he interpreted the
Act, pedophilia was a mental abnormality. He agreed that his interpretation of the statute was open to debate.
The jury found that Hendricks is a sexually violent predator. He was committed to the custody of the
Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS).
Hendricks challenges the constitutionality of the Act on various grounds, alleging the Act violates both
the United States and Kansas Constitutions. He argues the Act violates the prohibition against double
jeopardy and ex post facto laws, fails to provide equal protection and procedural or substantive due process,
and is void as overly broad and vague.
We first consider Hendricks' substantive due process challenge. In so doing, we must presume the Act
is constitutional and resolve all doubts in favor of the Act's validity. If there is any reasonable way to
construe the Act as constitutionally valid, we must do so.
Hendricks contends that his substantive due process liberty interest is violated by indefinite confinement
under K.S.A. 59-29 aO1 et seq. He relies on Foucha v. Louisiana. He represents the case as holding that
due process prohibits a person's being involuntarily committed by a civil proceeding absent a finding that
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the person is both mentally ill and dangerous. It is his contention that the Act's requirement of a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence falls short of a finding of mental illness. He points out that "[tihe express purpose of the statutory
scheme ... is to confine persons 'who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate
for involuntary treatment pursuant to the treatment act for mentally ill persons. . . .. '
It is clear that the overriding concern of the legislature is to continue the segregation of sexually violent
offenders from the public. Treatment with the goal of reintegrating them into society is incidental, at best.
The record reflects that treatment for sexually violent predators is all but nonexistent. The legislature
concedes that sexually violent predators are not amenable to treatment under K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. If there
is nothing to treat under 59-2901, then there is no mental illness. In that light, the provisions of the Act for
treatment appear somewhat disingenuous. . . .
It is clear that the primary objective of the Act is to continue incarceration and not to provide treatment.
Protecting the public is a legitimate exercise of the State's police power. Although the Act is a
well-intentioned attempt by the legislature to accomplish that objective, it cannot be done in a constitutionally
impermissible manner. Having said that, we need to point out that the legislature has provided the State with
other options to achieve that objective and, in addition, has the authority to increase the penalty for sex
crimes committed against children.
The record indicates that Hendricks had at least three felony convictions prior to being charged in the
present case. Under the Habitual Criminal Act, Hendricks' sentence could have been tripled. Also, Hendricks
could have been sentenced to the maximum rather than the minimum sentence. Additionally, the sentences
could have been ordered to run consecutively rather than concurrently. The State chose not to pursue any of
these options. Instead, the State opted to enter into a plea bargain with Hendricks. The State agreed to
dismiss one count, to recommend the statutory minimum sentence of 5 to 20 years, and to not seek imposition
of the Habitual Criminal Act.
The State now chooses to pursue the option under the Act to continue Hendricks' incarceration. The
State contends that commitment under the Act requires "a finding of mental illness and dangerousness ...
consistent with Foucha"....
We find no support in the Act that a finding of mental illness is required...
The State's principal evidence concerning Hendricks' mental state was the testimony of Charles Befort,
the chief psychologist at Lamed State Security Hospital. He testified that he did not believe Hendricks was
mentally ill or had a personality disorder....
We must determine if Hendricks is denied substantive due process based not on his lack of character but,
rather, on the merits of his challenge. Mental illness is defined in K.S.A. 59-2902(h) as meaning any person
who: "(1) [i]s suffering from a severe mental disorder to the extent that such person is in need of treatment;
(2) lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment; and (3) is likely to cause harm to self
or others." Here, neither the language of the Act nor the State's evidence supports a finding that "mental
abnormality or personality disorder," as used in 59-29 a02(a), is a "mental illness" as defined in 59-2902(h).
Absent such a finding, the Act does not satisfy the constitutional standard set out in Addington and Foucha.
Justice White, speaking for the majority of the United States Supreme Court in Foucha, clearly stated that
to indefinitely confine as dangerous one who has a personality disorder or antisocial personality but is not
mentally ill is constitutionally impermissible. Similarly, to indefinitely confine as dangerous one who has a
mental abnormality is constitutionally impermissible.
In addition, the State's own evidence is that Hendricks was being committed even though he does not
suffer from mental illness. Hendricks is not mentally ill, and the criminal offenses for which he was
imprisoned were not the result of mental illness. Therefore, as applied to Hendricks, the constitutionality of
the Act depends upon a showing of dangerousness without a finding of mental illness. Clearly, the due
process standard of Addington and Foucha is not met by the Act as applied to Hendricks. We conclude that
the Act violates Hendricks' substantive due process rights.
We hold that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Having so held, we need not consider the other issues raised
by Hendricks in this appeal. We note that the dissenters have chosen to consider and decide those issues,
notwithstanding that they have not been addressed or decided by the majority. That part of the dissent is
dicta and for that reason does not warrant a response.
283
The judgment of the district court is reversed.
LOCKETT, Justice, concurring: ...
The dissent disagrees with the basic premise, the underlying reasoning, and the decision of the majority
that the Act violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The dissent bases its reasoning on the decisions of the Supreme Courts of Washington and Wisconsin "which
are almost identical and substantially similar legislation in their respective states." The dissent failed to note
that a United States District Court disagreed with the decision of the Washington Supreme Court and
declared the similar Washington sexual violent predator act an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process,
Ex Post Facto, and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal Constitution when the same offender later
petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus....
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that
before an individual may be involuntarily committed for control, care, and treatment, the State must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous....
Leroy Hendricks has an antisocial personality. He is not mentally ill and could not be committed for
treatment to protect society. Hendricks committed sex crimes against children. He was sentenced and
imprisoned for those crimes. Without violating the Constitution, the State could have incarcerated Hendricks
until he exhaled his last breath and his spirit departed this earth, but it did not. Hendricks has now served
the criminal sentence imposed by the
State and under the law must now be released, even if he has an antisocial personality.
In an effort to protect society from individuals, such as Hendricks, who are antisocial and will in all
probability commit other sex crimes when released from prison, the Act was enacted. The Act reclassifies
persons to be mentally ill who are antisocial, a danger to others, and have been convicted of a specific sex
crime. The effect is that the criminal is reclassified as a mentally ill person. The Act permits the State to
civilly commit the criminal for treatment as a mentally ill person because of a past criminal act and the fact
that the individual has an antisocial personality....
The United States Supreme Court in Foucha v. Louisiana noted that to commit an individual to a mental
institution in a civil proceeding, the State is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the two statutory preconditions to commitment: The person sought to be committed is
mentally ill, and the person requires hospitalization for his or her own welfare and the protection of others.
The Supreme Court held that a convicted criminal, such as Hendricks, may not be held as a mentally ill
person because of criminal dangerousness.
Because the Washington act, which is almost identical and substantially similar legislation to the Kansas
act, was declared unconstitutional by the federal court, and the reasoning of the majority follows the prior
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, I must join the majority.
LARSON, Justice, dissenting:
I disagree with the basic premise, the underlying reasoning, and the conclusion of the majority that the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act) violates the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Kansas should join the decisions of the Supreme Courts of Washington and Wisconsin in upholding the
validity of almost identical and substantially similar legislation in their respective states....
The opinion of this court relies on substantive due process to declare the Act unconstitutional. However,
the majority fails to address directly what test should be used to measure the constitutionality of a legislative
act attacked on the basis of substantive due process. It appears to assume that if substantive due process
is implicated, the legislative act is ipso facto unconstitutional.
Where no fundamental right is involved, a statute attacked as violative of due process is subject to only
minimal scrutiny. This standard is functionally equivalent to the rational basis test in the context of equal
protection challenges. 'Under the 'rational basis' test, if there is any rational relationship between the act and
a legitimate governmental objective, the act passes muster. Under this test one challenging the
constitutionality of the act bears the burden of showing no rational relationship exists between the means and
the end."
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Thus, when considering whether a statute violates substantive due process, the first step in the analysis
is to determine whether it involves a flmdamental right. If it does not, a rational basis for the enactment will
be sufficient to allow it to pass constitutional muster. If a statute involves a fundamental right, the statute
is then subject to strict scrutiny....
There is no doubt that the civil commitment of sexually violent predators involves so significant a
deprivation of liberty that the protections of due process are invoked. This clearly requires that we apply the
strict scrutiny test and the analysis it involves. The question therefore becomes whether the State has shown
a sufficiently compelling interest to warrant the statute's undeniable intrusion on Hendricks' liberty and
whether the commitment scheme it has adopted is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. ...
Therefore, our analysis is based on a strict scrutiny test, beginning with the premise that the State of
Kansas has a compelling interest both in treating sexually violent predators and in protecting society from
their actions. The ultimate question then becomes whether the Act is sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve
those interests without unduly burdening individual rights. .. [T]he limited authority available suggests the
Act is a legitimate exercise of the legislature's power. ...
Addingtortells us little more than that one may not be involuntarily committed as mentally ill without
"something more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior." What is that "something more"?
Addington is unequivocal: That is a question reserved largely to the states. Therefore, since our Act requires
a higher degree of proof than the constitutional minimum, the Act appears to be "narrowly tailored" to restrict
its application to contexts where the interests of the State are most compelling....
The question is not whether Hendricks fits some clinical definition of mental illness, but whether he fit
a legislative classification that is more than mere idiosyncratic behavior "within a range that is generally
acceptable."
Consequently, the substantive due process analysis reduces to this: Has the State shown a compelling
interest to which its statutory scheme for involuntary commitment is narrowly tailored? As discussed above,
the State interest in confining and treating sexual predators is the protection of the public from random
violent sexual attack by persons known to the State to be likely to carry out such attacks. "[I]t is irrefutable
that the State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their
actions."
Is the Sexually Violent Predator Act sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the State's compelling
interest? I would answer this question with a ringing "yes." The Act is narrowly tailored in a number of
particulars. First, it does not apply to sex offenders generally, or even to all sex offenders suffering some
ailment of the mind, but applies only to those persons with an ongoing mental condition rendering them likely
to commit acts of sexual violence. Second, it does not apply to those susceptible to less restrictive treatment,
but only to those who require secure confinement to prevent such violence. Third, to reduce the risk of
erroneous detention it does not apply to all persons accused of sexually violent offenses, but only those
previously charged or convicted. Fourth, it does not apply in the face of meager, or even clear and
convincing evidence, but requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person qualifies for
confinement. Fifth, consistent with its narrowly focused goals, it requires treatment outside the Department
of Corrections. Sixth, it has adequate provisions for continuing reviews to ensure that only those persons
representing a continuing danger are confined and treated. These are not all the reasons but are more than
sufficient to require us to uphold the constitutionality of the Act.
For all of the reasons stated, I would hold that under established substantive due process analysis, the
Act is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling State interest and therefore passes constitutional muster.
Although this dissent has answered the grounds for constitutional invalidity relied on by the majority,
I write further, although not in great depth, about each additional issue raised by Hendricks which I would
hold to be insufficient to require the reversal of his adjudication as a sexually violent predator.
Equal Protection ....
mhe test for determining the constitutionality of a statute under due process and equal protection weighs
almost identical factors.
The Act focuses on the narrow problem of mental abnormality and violent, predatory sex crimes. Equal
protection of the law does not require the State to choose between attacking every aspect of a public danger
or not attacking any part of the danger at all. A statute does not violate equal protection just because it does
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not go as far as it might have gone. The Act does not violate equal protection principles for the same reason
it does not violate substantive due process--it is narrowly tailored to deal with a compelling State interest.
Civil or Punitive Nature of Act
Hendricks appeals the trial court's finding that the Act is civil in nature and remedial, contending it is
criminal and punitive. If the Act is criminal, Hendricks contends it is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. The legislature's purpose was
the protection of society from those rendered sexually dangerous by a mental ailment and the treatment of
such people. Together, these are permissible goals of a civil commitment scheme and do not convert the Act
into a criminal statute. I would hold the Act to be civil in nature; thus, it should be evaluated by the
standards applicable to such statutes.
Double Jeopardy....
As noted above, the legislative purpose of the Act is public safety and treatment of those committed, not
retribution or deterrence. Since it is remedial in nature and seeks neither punishment nor retribution, it does
not constitute a double jeopardy violation.
Ex post facto
Since the Act, as a civil statute, neither criminalizes conduct legal before its passage nor imposes
punishment for a crime, it does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Its concern is the current mental
condition of the person subject to commitment and his or her present dangerousness, not any past behavior
except as relevant to show current condition.
Procedural Due Process
Hendricks' argument that the Act violates procedural due process must also fail. Hendricks has failed
to overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds of double jeopardy, ex post
facto, and procedural due process largely because the Act is not punitive but remedial, not criminal but civil.
Conclusion
For all of the reasons hereinbefore set forth, I dissent from this court's opinion and would hold that the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act is constitutional. The trial court should be affirmed.
McFARLAND, C.J., and SIX, J., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
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95-891 OHIO v. ROBINETTE
Vehicle stops-Consent to search-Voluntari-
ness-Requirement that officer inform motorist
that traffic stop is over before officer requests
permission for search.
Ruling below (Ohio SupCt, 73 Ohio St.3d 650,
653 N.E.2d 695, 64 LW 2183, 57 CrL 1591):
Law enforcement officer's attempt to obtain
motorist's consent to search or to interrogate
about matters unrelated to traffic offenses that
prompted stop violates guarantees of Fourth
Amendment and Ohio Constitution against un-
reasonable search and seizure unless officer first
informs motorist that he or she is free to leave;
once police officer had issued warning to defend-
ant for speeding, officer lacked justification to
continue to detain defendant; defendant's consent
to search vehicle given during period of illegal
post-stop detention was invalid; drugs discovered
during officer's search of defendant's vehicle are
inadmissible at defendant's trial for drug abuse.
Question presented: Does Fourth Amendment
require police officers to inform motorists, lawful-
ly stopped for traffic violations, that legal deten-
tion has concluded before any subsequent interro-
gation or search will be found to be consensual?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/5/95, by Math-
ias H. Heck Jr., Pros. Attv. for Montgomery
Cty., Ohio, and Carley J. Ingram and Arvin S.
Miller, Asst. Pros. Attys.
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95-1268 MARYLAND v. WILSON
Vehicle stops-Ordering passengers out of lawful-
ly stopped vehicle.
Rulitg below' (Md CtSpecApp, 106 Md.App.
24, 664 A.2d 1, 64 LW 2207, 57 CrL 1560):
Unlike police officer's order for driver to exit
vehicle during traffic stop, which Supreme Court
said, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977), does no more than shift location of prior
detention, officer's order for passenger to exit
vehicle during traffic stop creates new detention;
accordingly, passenger's Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy interest in avoiding detention outweighs in-
terest in police officer's safety while conducting
traffic stop during which passenger "appeared
nervous"; order suppressing evidence of crack
cocaine that fell to ground when police officer
ordered defendant to exit vehicle in which he was
passenger is affirmed.
Question presented: When police officer makes
lawful traffic stop, does officer's automatic right
to order driver to exit vehicle, pursuant to Penn-
sylvania v. Mimms, extend to passengers in
stopped vehicle?
Petition for certiorari filed 2/9/96, by J. Jo-
seph Curran Jr., Md. Atty. Gen., and Gary E.
Bair, Mary Ellen Barbera, and Kathryn Grill
Graeff, Asst. Attys. Gen.
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COURT CASES MAY HELP DEFINE RIGHTS OF MOTORISTS
The Las Vegas Review-Journal
Tuesday, May 28, 1996
James Kilpatrick
Probably it's happened to you. Certainly it
has happened in our family. One minute we are
tootling down the road, listening to a little
Mozart, and the next minute there's a flashing
blue light in the rearview mirror. My wife says,
"Uh-oh." She says, "Pull over, honey, it's a cop."
In this universal situation, what are the rights of
the motorist? What are the powers of the cops?
More by design than by coincidence, four
separate cases now are pending in the U.S.
Supreme Court that present substantially these
questions. The court heard argument April 17 in
the first of them, MichaelA. Whren vs. US.
It turned out to be a remarkably fuzzy
argument, with the fuzziness divided equally
among the justices and the lawyers. At bottom,
the issue was "pretext." First the facts, then the
law. On the night of June 10, 1993, District of
Columbia vice officers, riding in unmarked cars,
were patrolling for drug operations in southeast
Washington. They saw a late-model Nissan
Pathfinder commit three minor traffic violations:
1) The driver, James L. Brown, stopped overly
long at a stop sign, 2) Brown made a right turn
without signaling, and 3) Brown drove toward
Minnesota Avenue at "unreasonable speed."
The plainclothes officers swooped down and
stopped the car. As Officer Efrain Soto
approached, he saw a front-seat passenger,
Michael A. Whren, holding a plastic bag of what
appeared to be crack cocaine in each hand. Soto
opened the door, dived across the seat and
grabbed one of the bags from Whren's hand.
Other officers joined in. They found additional
crack cocaine and two tinfoils of marijuana.
The defendants naturally moved to suppress
the evidence, on the grounds that the cops had
violated their constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial
court denied the motion, a jury convicted both
defendants, and the judge gave them 16 years in
the slammer. The D.C. Circuit affirmed.
Everyone agrees that the police cannot stop
a motorist just because they don't like his looks.
They must cite some objective reason for
turning on the blue lights. Otherwise the reason,
such as a failure to signal a turn, becomes a
mere pretext. Were the minor offenses in this
case "pretextual"? Put another way, were the
offenses the kind of offenses for which a
reasonable police officer "could have" stopped
the car or "would have" stopped it?
You might not believe the difference
between "could have" and "would have" could
have absorbed the court's attention for an hour,
but so it developed. The argument wandered
into departmental policies. In Washington, the
police department's written rule is that
plainclothes officers in unmarked cars are not to
enforce traffic laws "except in the case of a
violation that is so grave as to pose an
immediate threat to the safety of others." Is it
material or immaterial that the vice squad
violated this policy?
Another case, Ohio vs. Robert D. Robinette,
presents a different question. A Montgomery
County deputy sheriff Roger Newsome, stopped
Robinette in August 1993 for driving 69 mph in
a 45-mph construction zone. The deputy was
working a drug interdiction project. After giving
Robinette a warning, Newsome asked if he had
any drugs in the car. Robinette said no.
Newsome then asked if he could search the car.
Robinette said yes. The deputy found drugs.
Motion to suppress: denied. Verdict: guilty.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed. After he
had warned Robinette for speeding, Newsome
had failed to say to Robinette, "At this time you
are legally free to go," or words to that effect.
This made the search unconstitutional.
A third case, Maryland vs. Jerry Lee
Wilson, dates from a night in June 1994 when a
state trooper stopped a new Nissan Maxima for
not having a proper license plate. The driver,
one McNichol, seemed unduly nervous. His
passenger, Wilson, was visibly sweating. The
trooper ordered McNichol to exit the car. Then
the trooper ordered Wilson to step out of the
car. Crack cocaine dropped to the ground.
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Beyond question, the trooper had a right to
order the driver to step out. A 1977 Supreme
Court case is directly in point. But what about
the passenger? Maryland's Special Court of
Appeals said, no, nervous perspiration is not
enough; the order was unreasonable.
The fourth case, Enrique Ruvalcaba vs. Los
Angeles, came out the other way. Police stopped
a car for failure to stop at a stop sign and
ordered Ruvalcaba, a passenger, to step out. A
fight ensued. Ruvalcaba was hurt. He sued the
cops, charging that the order violated his rights.
The 9th U.S. Court of Appeals said no way. The
order was reasonable.
There the law stands, or at least there the
law wobbles. As a driver, what are your rights?
What are your passengers' rights? We will know
by the time term ends in late June.
(James J. Kilpatrick writes a syndicated column
about the court system.)
Distributed by Universal Press Syndicate. All
Rights Reserved
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JUSTICES TO CONSIDER WHEN POLICE CAN ORDER
MOTORISTS TO EXIT CARS
The Associated Press
Monday, June 17, 1996
Richard Carelli
WASHINGTON (AP) - You're a passenger in a car that gets stopped for a
routine traffic violation. May the police order you and the driver to get out?
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to answer that question, arising from a
Maryland confrontation repeated hundreds or thousands of times across the
nation each day. The case pits privacy rights against police safety.
Maryland prosecutors want the justices to use the case to extend a key 1977
high court ruling in which the justices said motorists stopped for routine traffic
violations may be ordered by police to exit their cars. Such a rule "reduces the
likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault," the court said 19 years
ago.
Maryland prosecutors said that ruling should apply to a car's passengers as
well. Maryland state trooper David Hughes stopped a car along Interstate 95 in
Baltimore County one June evening in 1994. He had clocked the car's speed at
64 mph in a 55-mph zone and noted it had no license tag.
The car had three occupants, and Hughes spoke briefly to the driver while
both men stood between their cars. While speaking to the driver, Hughes said he
noticed that Jerry Lee Wilson, a passenger in the front seat, seemed very nervous.
Wilson balked when first asked by Hughes to get out of the car. When he opened
the door and took one step out, crack cocaine dropped to the ground. Hughes
arrested Wilson.
Wilson sought to have the cocaine suppressed as evidence, contending that
Hughes had violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures when he ordered him out of the car. Maryland courts agreed
with him.
State prosecutors said that most courts considering such cases elsewhere
have allowed police automatically to order all passengers from a car. Maryland
courts and others that do not, the state's appeal said, "endanger the hundreds, if
not thousands, of police officers who stop vehicles each day for traffic
violations."
Copyright 1996. The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.
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SUPREME COURT AGREES TO CLARIFY POLICE AUTHORITY IN
TRAFFIC STOPS
Md. Case Brings Up Issue Of Officers' Safety
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, June 18, 1996
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court, heeding a
plea by the state of Maryland, agreed yesterday to
spell out the authority of police to order all
passengers out of cars they have stopped, to control
occupants' movements.
At issue is the constitutionality of a police
order, after a car is stopped for a traffic violation,
that all the passengers get out -- a move that the
state contends is required to assure police safety.
Maryland's highest court, the Court of Appeals,
ruled in August that the Constitution's Fourth
Amendment does not allow police to routinely order
passengers out of vehicles. Only if police have
reason to think that "extra caution" is required may
they order all passengers to exit, the appeals court
said.
That ruling, Maryland Attorney General J.
Joseph Curran Jr. said in a statement yesterday,
could take away "one of an officer's most effective
tools in a potentially dangerous situation -- being
able to legally control the actions of a driver and
passengers during a traffic stop. We must convince
the Supreme Court to give the police this tool back."
Curran said he would argue the case himself
when it comes up in the Supreme Court for a
hearing, probably in January. A ruling is expected
before next summer.
The issue has split lower courts. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, like Maryland's highest
court, has ruled against routine police orders for
passengers to get out. But a federal appeals court
ruled that police could require that
stops.
in all traffic
The Supreme Court voted last month to leave
that appeals court ruling intact. It gave no
explanation. Yesterday, however, when the
Maryland case came up, the justices granted review.
The Maryland case is a sequel to a 1977
Supreme Court ruling. Then, the justices ruled that
no constitutional rights were violated when police
ordered the driver of a stopped vehicle to get out.
That decision, however, applied only to the driver,
not to passengers.
The Maryland case stems from an incident on
Interstate 95 in Baltimore County in June 1994.
David Hughes, a Maryland state trooper, saw a car
moving at high speed and took up a chase.
The officer, with lights flashing on his patrol
car, chased the vehicle for 1 V2 miles, into Baltimore
City, before it pulled over. The driver got out on his
own, and Hughes noticed that he seemed nervous.
The passenger in the front seat, Jerry Lee Wilson,
was sweating and appeared nervous, too, the officer
said later.
The officer told Wilson to get out of the car.
When he did, a packet of crack cocaine fell to the
ground. Hughes drew his gun and arrested Wilson.
Later, the officer said that movement in the vehicle
had raised a suspicion that a gun could be in the car.
Copyright 1996 OThe Baltimore Sun Company
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HIGH COURT TO RULE ON
POLICE SAFETY VS. CAR-PASSENGER RIGHTS
The Washington Times
Sunday, April 28, 1996
Frank J. Murray
The U.S. Supreme Court appears anxious to
decide if the civil rights of passengers required to
step from automobiles during routine traffic stops
are more important than a police officer's life.
Justices have requested filings on that point by May
2 in two cases - a drug bust by an inexperienced
Maryland state trooper and a civil lawsuit against
Los Angeles officers who beat passengers in a car
that ran a stop sign.
A coalition of 25 other states led by Ohio asked
the court to review and reverse a Maryland Court of
Special Appeals decision that "devalued the state's
interest in protecting its law enforcement officers."
"The very fact that you've got two appellate
courts arguing about it suggests to me the cop on the
scene is the best judge of what is best for the cop on
the scene's safety," said Bill Johnson, a former
policeman who is general counsel of the National
Association of Police Organizations. "They should
not have to take the chance that the answer is a
bullet," Mr. Johnson said.
The case being appealed in Maryland vs.
Wilson attacks suppression of crack cocaine
evidence that fell on the street when a passenger got
out of the car.
Attorney General J. Joseph Curran Jr. said such
police orders intrude minimally on a passenger but
are vital to the officer, so they should apply to
everyone in a car. "I'm really troubled by the
decision that police safety is not a factor when
making a legitimate traffic stop," Mr. Curran said in
an interview.
In the Los Angeles case, the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals decided officer safety justified
ordering passenger Enrique Ruvalcaba out of the
car. Mr. Ruvalcaba said his civil rights were
violated by Officers David Jacoby and John Backus,
who enforced their order with nightsticks in the Feb.
28, 1991, incident.
"The 9th Circuit decision . .. is based upon
unproven and probably erroneous assumptions of
appellate judges about what enhances officer safety
and what detracts from it," said Mr. Ruvalcaba's
attorneys.
In addition to civil attorney John C. Burton of
Pasadena, Mr. Ruvalcaba is backed by Robert Mann
of the Police Misconduct Lawyers Referral Service.
"Police decisions unreasonably to order people
about - like ordering Mr. Ruvalcaba out of the car
into the rain - are most often directed at ethnic
minorities and others who have the least power to
do anything about it," said Mr. Mann, whose legal
brief minimized claims of danger by saying four
times as many officers kill themselves as are killed
by criminals.
Drivers have no option under the Supreme
Court's 1977 Pennsylvania vs. Mimms decision
allowing officers to order them to get out or to
remain inside during the most minor stops, without
requiring suspicion they may be armed. "What is at
most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when
balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's
safety," the court said in that case.
Two federal courts and state courts in 13 states
apply that to passengers as well. Maryland and
three other states do not.
Citing murders of state Troopers Theodore
Wolf in 1990 and Edward Plank in 1995 during
traffic stops, Mr. Curran said all officers need full
leeway.
"It's important because police officers need to
protect themselves when they make a traffic stop
and, oftentimes, what appears to be a routine traffic
stop ends up not being routine," said Assistant
Attorney General Gary E. Bair.
"One of the ways officers can protect
themselves is to deal with a driver and passengers
one at a time in a way that gives them some control
over the situation," Mr. Bair said.
The Maryland case involves crack cocaine
charges against Jerry Lee Wilson of Florence, S.C.,
a passenger in a car stopped on Interstate 95 for
doing 64 mph in a 55 mph zone on June 8, 1994.
Trooper David Hughes said the three men in the car
293
acted "furtively," but the appeals court upheld the
trial judge ruling that the officer had no suspicions,justified or unjustified. The state wants the
Supreme Court to say Trooper Hughes needed no
suspicion to order Mr. Wilson out.
police cannot stop a passenger from leaving the
scene when a car is stopped for traffic violations.
"The passenger is presumptively free to
abandon the driver to the clutches of the law and to
hail a cab." the court said.
In a related Maryland case, Mr. Curran asked The Washington Times Copyright 1996
the state appeals court to reconsider its order that
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COURT TO HEAR TRAFFIC STOP CASE
Montgomery Prosecutor Appeals
Dayton Daily News
Tuesday, March 5, 1996
Rob Modic, Dayton Daily News
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday accepted
a Montgomery County prosecutor's request to
review an Ohio case that requires police to tell
motorists they are free to go before pressing them
about illegal drugs or firearms. The case could
impact thousands of cases throughout the country
where similar practices have become routine.
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled 4-3 on Sept. 6
that traffic officers who routinely stop drivers for
traffic offenses must tell them they are "free to go"
before making any additional inquiries about
whether their car contains any contraband. Failure to
speak those words automatically forfeits any
evidence that may be subsequently detected, the
court ruled.
The court majority drew on a decision by the
Ohio 2nd District Court of Appeals in Dayton that
decided 2-1 on April 15, 1994, to throw out a
conviction of Robert D. Robinette. He was stopped
on Aug. 3, 1992, on Interstate 70 for driving 69
mph in a 45 mile per hour construction zone at
Diamond Mill Road.
The sheriff's deputy who made the stop, Ronald
Newsome, later testified at a hearing that he had
already decided to give Robinette only a warning
before he spoke to him. However, before returning
Robinette's driver's license, Newsome turned on a
video recorder on his cruiser and asked Robinette if
he could search his car for drugs. Robinette said
"yes." Newsome found a small amount of
methamphetamine.
Newsome was part of a unit directed to interdict
potential drug couriers on highways in and around
Dayton. Robinette's stop was one of more than 780
made by Newsome in 1992. That compared with
about 1,522 requests for searches by all of Ohio's
1,427 troopers in 1993. The state highway patrol
reported that of the 1,410 searches that drivers
agreed to in 1993, only 213 resulted in finding
contraband.
Writing for the majority in the Ohio Supreme
Court case, Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul E.
Pfeifer said that the case demonstrated the need for
the court to clear up the haziness of when a driver is
able to freely give consent to a continuing,
unsubstantiated police inquiry.
Upholding the right of police to obtain consent
from willing drivers, "we do not believe that this
legality should be used by police officers to turn a
routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for
unrelated criminal activity," Pfeifer said.
The Ohio court said the "bright line" to
detemiine that a driver knows his rights becomes the
officer's announcement that he is free to go, Pfeifer
said. Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices J.
Craig Wright and Justice Alice Robie Resnick
joined Pfeifer.
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Francis E.
Sweeney objected, saying the U.S. Supreme Court
had decided many a long line of cases that made the
crucial legal test one of "taking into account all of
the circumstances surrounding the encounter"
between the citizen and the police. That's what
prosecutors are seeking from the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Carley J. Ingram, chief of the Montgomery
County prosecutor's appeals division, and defense
attorney James D. Ruppert said this will be their
first appearance before the nation's highest court.
Ingram said it has been about 10 years since a
Montgomery County criminal case was argued
before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Dayton Daily News Copyright 1996
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DRIVERS MUST YIELD A FEW RIGHTS TO POLICE
IN WAR AGAINST CRIME, COURT DECIDES
The Columbus Dispatch, Editorial & Comment
Monday, July 1, 1996
Richard Cordray
The most frequent contacts between police
officers and many citizens stem from occasional
stops made for routine traffic violations or minor
infractions of the voluminous motor-vehicle laws.
Over the years, as automobile travel has become
ubiquitous, the Supreme Court has confronted many
constitutional issues involving the extent of police
authority in such encounters. Some of its decisions
have been quite controversial. For example, in a
case decided in 1970 - but still debated today - the
court decided that when the occupants of a vehicle
are arrested for any reason, the entire vehicle can be
searched without a warrant.
The court's positions on these issues have been
greatly influenced by an overriding concern about
the mobility of criminal suspects, contraband and
other evidence of crime. The court has understood
that the automobile (and now also the telephone and
computer) has greatly enhanced criminal enterprises.
In response, the court has been willing to allow a
correspondingly greater latitude to police officers in
fighting crime.
But even as more criminals use cars and trucks
in their operations, more law-abiding citizens are
using them in their daily lives. As a result,
aggressive police tactics aimed at identifying
lawbreakers can inconvenience ordinary people, as
well as intrude upon their privacy. Two examples
that have been considered by the Supreme Court in
recent years are random stops to check for proper
license and vehicle registration, which the court
invalidated in 1979, and roadside sobriety
checkpoints, which the court upheld in 1990.
Two new cases - one from Ohio - also illustrate
these tensions. In the first, the court considered
whether it is constitutional for police officers to stop
a motorist and warn him about alleged traffic
violations that are so minor that a "reasonable
officer" would not have done so, in order to look for
evidence of other criminal activity.
In this case, Whren vs. United States,
plainclothes police officers were patrolling a
"high-drug area" in Washington in an unmarked car.
They observed a truck that waited at a stop sign for
an unusually long time while the driver looked down
into the lap of his passenger, then turned suddenly
without signaling and sped away. The police
followed the truck and eventually pulled up
- alongside it -at a stoplight. One of the officers got
out and approached the vehicle. He later testified
that he did so to give the driver a warning about
possible traffic violations. He identified himself as
a police officer and instructed the driver to put the
truck in park. He saw two bags of crack cocaine in
the truck, whereupon he arrested its occupants.
The driver and the passengers were convicted
on federal drug charges. They appealed, contending
that the traffic stop and resulting seizure of the
drugs were improper because the alleged traffic
violations were used as a mere pretext for the
officers to detain and investigate them. Last month,
the court unanimously rejected their claims and
upheld their convictions. In essence, the court made
it clear that it was not willing to second-guess the
subjective motivations of police officers in any
circumstances where they actually had probable
cause to stop a vehicle. In this case, the officers had
probable cause to believe that traffic laws had been
violated.
This decision gives police a powerful tool to
combat crime, but it also enables police to interfere
(whether deliberately or not) with ordinary citizens.
Because the use of automobiles is so heavily and
minutely regulated, it is almost impossible to obey
perfectly every traffic and equipment regulation.
This decision will thus permit the police to single
out almost anyone they wish to stop. While not
denying this point, the court observed that it does
not have the authority or the inclination to say that
the traffic code has become so expansive that police
officers can be prevented from enforcing it. And
this decision, though not without its troubling
aspects, is almost surely right.
The second case - Ohio vs. Robinette - will be
argued before the Supreme Court later this year. It
concerns the constitutionality of a new
law-enforcement practice that has become common
in many places, including Montgomery County. An
officer who stops a vehicle for any legitimate
purpose is instructed to ask the driver for consent to
search the vehicle, if it seems useful for any reason,
at the end of the detention. The Supreme Court has
generally treated consent searches as purely
voluntary transactions: The officer is free to ask
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permission, and citizens are free to grant or withhold
it as they see fit. Although a heated debate has long
raged over whether this is a realistic view of most
police encounters, the court has held that such
"consent searches" are constitutional in any setting
where a reasonable citizen would feel free just to
end the conversation and walk away.
The issue in the Robinette case is whether a
reasonable person in the motorist's position would
feel free to leave. Concerned about the pressures
inherent in this situation, the Ohio Supreme Court -
held that in order for the consent to be valid, the
officer must expressly instruct the motorist that he
or she is free to leave before seeking permission to
search. The Ohio Supreme Court was particularly
concerned about the fact that the officer's
motivations in asking for permission to search the
vehicle were essentially unrelated to the legitimate
purpose for the traffic stop - a concern that
apparently cannot bear as much emphasis in the
wake of the recent Whren decision.
It is certainly plausible that a motorist might
give permission for a search simply because he or
she feared that a refusal would cause the officer to
retaliate by taking harsher measures with respect to
any alleged traffic violations. Nonetheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court has construed the notion of
"voluntary consent" very broadly (to include, for
example, consent given in situations where the
-officer has made some show of authority). It is thus
likely that the court will reverse the Ohio ruling next
year.
If so, this case will confirm once again the
current Supreme Court's strong feeling that ordinary
citizens must make an increasing number of small
sacrifices oftheir liberty and privacy in order to arm
our police more effectively to combat crime.
(Richard Cordray, formerly the Ohio state solicitor,
is an attorney in private practice.)
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The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,
V.
ROBINETTE, Appellee
73 Ohio St.3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Submitted May 24, 1995.
Decided Sept. 6, 1995.
On August 3, 1992, appellee, Robert D. Robinette, was driving his car at sixty-nine miles per hour in
a forty-five miles per hour construction zone on Interstate 70 in Montgomery County. Deputy Roger
Newsome of the Montgomery County Sheriffs office, who was on drug interdiction patrol at the time,
stopped Robinette for a speeding violation.
Before Newsome approached Robinette's vehicle, he had decided to issue Robinette only a verbal
warning, as was his routine practice regarding speeders in that particular construction zone. Robinette
supplied the deputy with his driver's license, and Newsome returned to his vehicle to check it. Finding no
violations, Newsome returned to Robinette's vehicle. At that point, Newsome had no intention of issuing
Robinette a speeding ticket. Still, Newsome asked Robinette to get out of his car and step to the rear of the
vehicle. Newsome returned to Robinette, issued a verbal warning regarding Robinette's speed, and returned
Robinette's driver's license.
After returning the license, Newsome said to Robinette, "One question before you get gone [sic]: are you
carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" Newsome
testified that as part of the drug interdiction project he routinely asked permission to search the cars he
stopped for speeding violations. When Robinette said that he did not have any contraband in the car,
Newsome asked if he could search the vehicle. Robinette testified that he was shocked at the question and
"automatically" answered "yes" to the deputy's request Robinette testified further that he did not believe that
he was at liberty to refuse the deputy's request.
Upon his search of Robinette's vehicle, Newsome found a small amount of marijuana ... [and] "some
sort of pill" inside a film container. The pill was determined to be methylenedioxy methamphetamine
("MDMA") and was the basis for Robinette's subsequent arrest and charge for a violation of R.C.
2925.11(A).
Robinette filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the search of his vehicle. The trial court
overruled the motion on March 8, 1993, finding that the deputy made clear to Robinette that the traffic matter
was concluded before asking to search the vehicle. The court ruled that Robinette's consent did not result
from any overbearing behavior on behalf of Newsome.
Robinette appealed. The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County reversed the trial court, holding that
Robinette remained detained when the deputy asked to search the car, and since the purpose of the traffic stop
had been accomplished prior to that point, the continuing detention was unlawful and the ensuing consent
was invalid.
This matter is before this court upon an allowance of a discretionary appeal.
PFEIFER, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether the evidence used against Robinette was obtained through a valid search.
We find that the search was invalid since it was the product of an unlawful seizure. We also use this case
to establish a bright-line test, requiring police officers to inform motorists that their legal detention has
concluded before the police officer may engage in any consensual interrogation....
In this case, Newsome certainly had cause to pull over Robinette for speeding. The question is when
the validity of that stop ceased Newsome testified that from the outset he never intended to ticket Robinette
for speeding. When Newsome returned to Robinette's car after checking Robinette's license, every aspect
of the speeding violation had been investigated and resolved. All Newsome had to do was to issue his
warning and return Robinette's driver's license.
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Instead, for no reason related to the speeding violation, and based on no articulable facts, Newsome
extended his detention of Robinette by ordering him out of the vehicle. Newsome retained Robinette's
driver's license and told Robinette to stand in front of the cruiser. Newsome then returned to the cruiser and
activated the video camera in order to record his questioning of Robinette regarding whether he was carrying
any contraband in the vehicle.
When the motivation behind a police officer's continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic
violation is not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention
is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an
extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure.
Newsome asked Robinette to step out of his car for the sole purpose of conducting a line of questioning
that was not related to the initial speeding stop and that was not based on any specific or articulable facts that
would provide probable cause for the extension of the scope of the seizure of Robinette, his passenger and
his car. Therefore the detention of Robinette ceased being legal when Newsome asked him to leave his
vehicle.
However, . . . Robinette consented to the search of his vehicle during the illegal seizure. Because
Robinette's consent was obtained during an illegal detention, his consent is invalid unless the state proves
that the consent was not the product of the illegal detention but the result of an independent act of free
will. ...
In this case there was no time lapse between the illegal detention and the request to search, nor were there
any circumstances that might have served to break or weaken the connection between one and the other. The
sole purpose of the continued detention was to illegally broaden the scope of the original detention.
Robinette's consent clearly was the result of his illegal detention, and was not the result of an act of will on
his part. Given the circumstances, Robinette felt that he had no choice but to comply.
This case demonstrates the need for this court to draw a bright line between the conclusion of a valid
seizure and the beginning of a consensual exchange. Newsome tells Robinette that before he leaves
Newsome wants to know whether Robinette is carrying any contraband. Newsome does not ask if he may
ask a question, he simply asks it, implying that Robinette must respond before he may leave. The
interrogation then continues. Robinette is never told that he is free to go or that he may answer the question
at his option.
Most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the officer continues to
interrogate them. The police officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the
officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person
would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him.
We are aware that consensual encounters between police and citizens are an important, and
constitutional, investigative tool. However, . . . [a] "consensual encounter" immediately following a detention
is likely to be imbued with the authoritative aura of the detention. Without a clear break from the detention,
the succeeding encounter is not consensual at all.
Therefore, we are convinced that the right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be
secure in one's person and property requires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by
the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in
a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase "At this
time you legally are free to go" or by words of similar import.
While the legality of consensual encounters between police and citizens should be preserved, we do not
believe that this legality should be used by police officers to turn a routine traffic stop into a fishing
expedition for unrelated criminal activity. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., and WRIGHT and RESNICK, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr. and COOK, JJ., dissent.
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., Justice, dissenting.
I am disturbed by the majority's requirement that police officers must now recite certain words before
a consensual interrogation may begin. This "bright-line" test appears unique to Ohio and vastly undercuts
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our law enforcement's ability to ferret out crime. Furthermore, the majority's test is contrary to
well-established state and federal constitutional law....
Indeed, courts from around the nation have had no problem in upholding the validity of consensual
searches where consent was obtained after a traffic stop....
I would instead apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test to this case. Here, appellee was properly
stopped and detained for speeding. After the traffic matter was concluded, the officer returned appellee's
license. Appellee testified that he believed he was free to leave. At this point, the encounter between appellee
and the police officer became an ordinary consensual encounter between a private citizen and a law
enforcement officer. Since appellee's liberties were not curtailed and since he understood that he could leave,
there was no "seizure" implicating state or federal constitutional guarantees. Appellee's consent should not
be invalidated solely because it followed a traffic stop and simply because the police officer failed to warn
appellee that he was free to go. The utterance of these "magic words" is but one factor for the fact-finder to
consider when making the determination as to whether consent was voluntarily given.
This technique of requesting consent following an initial valid detention is employed on a daily basis
throughout this nation to interdict the flow of drugs. The majority's bright-line test undercuts police authority
and severely curtails an important law enforcement tool that is sanctioned by state and federal constitutional
law.
For all these reasons, I would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment.
DOUGLAS and COOK, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
300
95-1717 U.S. v. LANIER
Civil rights-Criminal prosecutions-State
judge's sexual assault of employees and litigants.
Ruling below (CA 6 (en banc), 73 F.3d 1380,
58 CrL 1437):
Constitutionally necessary limiting construc-
tion given by plurality in Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S.
91 (1945), to federal statute that prohibits depri-
vation of constitutional rights under color of law,
18 USC 242, requires that constitutional right
allegedly violated by state actor be one that has
been specifically established by decision of U.S.
Supreme Court in factual circumstances similar
to those charged; U.S. Supreme Court has not
established that state actor who sexually assaults
or sexually harasses someone violates that per-
son's substantive due process right to be free from
interference with bodily integrity that shocks con-
science, and, therefore, state judge's sexual as-
saults and harassment of court employees and
litigants do not qualify as constitutional crimes
for purposes of Section 242.
Questions presented: (1) Does Screws v. U.S.
prohibit defendant from being convicted under
Section 242 for willful violation of right secured
by Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
unless that right has previously been made specif-
ic by decision of this court in factually similar
circumstances? (2) For purposes of Section 242,
has right, secured by Due Process Clause, to be
free from interference with bodily integrity by
sexual assault by state official acting under color
of law been "made specific" within meaning of
Screws v. U.S.?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/22/96, by Drew
S. Days III, Sol. Gen., Deval L. Patrick, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Paul Bender, Dpty. Sol. Gen., Paul
R.Q. Wolfson, Asst. to Sol. Gen., and Jessica
Dunsay Silver and Thomas E. Chandler, Dept. of
Justice attys.
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JUDGE CONVICTED OF SEXUAL ASSAULT WINS REVERSAL
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
Volume 142, No. 30, February 12, 1996
Margo L. Ely
In a case that may be on its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the full 6th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction of a Tennessee
state judge charged with sexually assaulting and
harassing employees and litigants in his chambers.
In US. v. Lanier, the majority in the en banc
ruling held that the constitutional right to bodily
integrity, recognized under substantive due process,
does not encompass sexual assaults. Tennessee
Judge David Lanier was prosecuted under the same
federal law that former Los Angeles police officers
Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell were prosecuted
under for the March 3, 1991, beating of Rodney
King. Those guilty verdicts were upheld in 1994 by
the 9th Circuit in US. v. Koon.
The 6th Circuit's ruling in Lanier conflicts with
Koon and other cases, presenting a compelling
reason for Supreme Court review. David Lanier is
from a politically prominent family, which for
generations has occupied positions of power in Dyer
County, Tenn., a rural community. He served as
alderman and mayor of Dyersburg before being
elected a chancery court judge in 1982. As the only
chancellor and Juvenile Court judge in both Dyer
and Lake counties, all employees of the area courts
were hired and fired at Lanier's discretion.
One employee, Sandy Sanders, was hired by
Lanier in 1989 to supervise the Youth Service
Office of the Dyer County Juvenile Court.
According to Sanders, she sat beside the judge
during a meeting in his chambers, and he grabbed
and squeezed one of her breasts. Sanders tried to
rebuff Lanier, who told her to not be afraid. She
raced out, but did not tell anybody about the episode
because of Lanier's stature in the community.
Sanders later confronted Lanier, and he
apologized. However, Lanier soon began
complaining about Sanders' work performance and
eventually removed her supervisory authority.
In the fall of 1990, Patty Mahoney was hired by
Lanier to be his secretary, but quit after two weeks.
According to Mahoney, during that time, Lanier
hugged her and touched her breasts and buttocks.
Lanier allegedly told Mahoney, "If you will sleep
with me, you can do anything you want to. You can
come in to work any time you want to; you can leave
any time you want to." On one occasion, Lanier
allegedly lifted Mahoney off the floor and pressed
his pelvis against her. When Mahoney objected,
Lanier told her that if she reported it, she would be
hurt more than him.
Vivian Archie grew up in Dyersburg, and in
1989 Judge Lanier presided over her divorce
proceedings and awarded her custody of her
daughter. A year later, when Archie was out of work
and living with her parents, she learned of a job
opening at the courthouse. She applied for the job
and met with Lanier in his chambers.
Lanier allegedly led Archie to believe she might
lose custody of her child and told her he promised
the job to someone else. Archie claimed that after
she pleaded for a job, the judge grabbed her and
forced her to perform oral sex on him.
Archie did not scream or report the incident
because, she said, she was afraid Lanier would
revoke the custody order.
A few weeks later, Lanier called Archie's house
and told her mother of another job. Her mother
urged her to find out about the job, and she went
back to Lanier's chambers. She said the judge again
sexually assaulted her.
In March 1991, Lanier hired a new secretary,
Sandy Attaway, who claimed that she too became a
target of Lanier's sexual advances. According to
Attaway, after Lanier terminated her, he told her
they would have gotten along fine if she had liked
oral sex.
Later that year, Fonda Bandy went to see Lanier
about her work for a federal program, Drug Free
Public Housing, and solicit his support. According
to Bandy, the judge assaulted her, too. Bandy never
returned.
On May 20, 1992, a federal grand jury indicted
Lanier on 11 counts of the willful deprivation under
color of law of the civil rights of various women in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. At the time of the
indictment, eight women had leveled charges against
Lanier.
Ajuy found Lanier guilty of seven counts, two
of which were felonies, five of which were
misdemeanors. Lanier was sentenced to 25 years in
prison. The episodes above represent the counts that
yielded convictions.
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Unlike Koon and Powell, Lanier was not
prosecuted in a state tribunal before his federal
prosecution: Lanier's brother had been elected
district attorney, thus having control of criminal
prosecutions in the area.
During the trial, Lanier testified that he never
assaulted or harassed any of his accusers. He did
concede, however, that he and Sanders hugged and
kissed as a greeting gesture until she told him it
made her uncomfortable. Similarly, Lanier testified
that he and Mahoney hugged every day. Likewise,
he testified that Bandy hugged and kissed him when
they met in his chambers.
Lanier also admitted that he told Archie about
potential custody problems, but denied forcing
himself on her. The man behind the second job
Archie inquired about testified that Lanier told him
that Archie might be willing to provide sexual
favors if he hired her.
Lanier appealed to the 6th Circuit, and a
three-judge panel affirmed. In the en banc rehearing,
a majority voted to reverse Lanier's convictions,
holding that the law "as applied in this case, does
not specifically mention or contemplate sex crimes,
and including sexual misconduct within its coverage
stretches its meaning beyond its original purpose."
Section 242 criminalizes the willful
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States" by persons acting "under color of
law."
Adopted in 1874, the law was part of a
codification of federal civil rights acts, including the
Ku Klux Klan Act. Several famous cases that
involved prosecutions of public officials for
murdering blacks in the South were brought by the
federal government under section 242.
In Lanier, the prosecution asserted that sexual
assault is a constitutional crime under the 14th
Amendment defined as "interference with bodily
integrity that shocks the conscience of the court and
the jury."
In reversing Lanier's conviction, the majority
reached five conclusions. First, the majority held
that when Congress passed section 242, it did so by
accident. According to the majority, in 1870
Congress hired a codifier, one Mr. Durant. Although
he "was charged with making no substantive
changes, in fact, [section 242] dramatically
expanded criminal liability for civil rights violations
. .. and created a new crime that had not previously
existed. Congress adopted the new compilation of
laws apparently without realizing that any
substantive change had been made." Therefore, the
legislative history favored reversal.
Second, the majority considered the absence of
a Supreme Court case explicitly holding that sexual
assault by state officials is a constitutional tort to be
particularly significant. In this regard, the majority
rejected the suggestion that the case law establishing
an "abstract general right to 'bodily integrity' "
encompasses a "general constitutional right to be
free from sexual assault." The majority also rejected
a 5th Circuit decision affirming a conviction under
section 242 of two border patrol officers who
conditioned entry into the United States upon sexual
favors.
Third, the majority found the 14th Amendment's
"shocks the conscience" standard to be too
indefinite, requiring the jury to "make an essentially
arbitrary judgment.... The language as applied in
different cases will yield results that depend too
heavily on factual particularity of an individual set
of events and upon biases and opinions of individual
jurors." The majority's reasoning, however, would
likewise render unconstitutional the contemporary
community standard of decency used in
pornography prosecutions, the "brutal and heinous"
requirement for death penalty eligibility and,
arguably, the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
requirement for criminal guilt.
Fourth, in accordance with the principle that
criminal statutes must be strictly construed, the
majority concluded that Lanier could not be held
criminally liable for his conduct because of a lack of
notice: "No language of the statute and no holding
of the Supreme Court suggest that such behavior
constitutes a federal constitutional crime."
Finally, the majority pointed out that the
Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Screws v. U.S.,
which upheld the constitutionality of section 242,
referred to the wrong as racial discrimination and to
the "original purpose of the act . . . [as] an
anti-discrimination measure ... framed to protect
Negroes in their newly won rights."
The five dissenting opinions criticized the
majority on several fronts. Many of the dissents
defirred to the "eloquent" and persuasive dissent by
Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey.
"The majority," Daughtrey wrote, "finds that the
right to freedom from a willful sexual assault at the
hands of a sitting judge has not been made specific
by prior court decision solely because no Supreme
Court case has yet explicitly involved a factual
situation with a judge who so dishonored his
profession or who sunk to such levels of depravity
as has the defendant in this case."
After providing an analysis of pertinent case
law, Daughtrey stated, "All circuit courts that have
addressed this or similar issues have . .. recognized
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the seemingly axiomatic principle that a citizen's
right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law encompasses the right
not to be intentionally and sexually assaulted under
color of law."
Judge Damon J. Keith provided a sobering and
pointed conclusion: "In a country where the average
person may go to jail for stealing a loaf of bread, the
majority releases back into the community a judge
who has used the power of his office and his
position in society to repeatedly victimize women. If
federal law is not to protect women from being
forced to sexually gratify a judicial officer at his
request under threats of losing their jobs or children,
whom is it to protect?"
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WOMEN'S CIVIL RIGHTS AT ISSUE IN LANIER CASE
The Commercial Appeal Memphis, TN
Tuesday, June 18, 1996
James W. Brosnan, Washington Bureau
The Supreme Court Monday agreed to decide
whether to send former West Tennessee Judge
David Lanier back to prison in an important test of
whether federal civil rights law protects women
from sexual assault.
The underlying issue is whether a person has a
constitutional right to "bodily integrity." By taking
the Lanier case, the court "has taken a very
important step by agreeing for the first time really to
decide whether the Constitution protects a woman
victim of sexual assault," said Judith Lichtman,
president of the Women's Legal Defense Fund.
Lanier, 61, a Chancery Court judge in Dyer and
Lake counties, was sentenced to 25 years in prison
after a federal court jury in 1992 convicted him on
seven charges of assaulting five court employees or
job applicants. He was convicted under an 1874 law
making it a crime for government officials to use
their official authority to willfully deprive someone
of rights "protected by the Constitution."
One former deputy clerk testified Lanier put his
hands between her legs in the courtroom. A job
applicant said Lanier forced her to perform oral sex
on him by suggesting an adverse ruling in her child
custody case. A fired secretary said Lanier told her
she could have kept her job if she liked oral sex.
But Lanier's conviction was thrown out Jan. 23
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled
9-6 that sexual assault was not covered by the main
civil rights law used historically to prosecute white
officials who denied rights to minorities.
The court said Lanier should have been brought
up on state charges, ignoring the fact, federal
prosecutors said, that his brother James was the
local state prosecutor. Lanier's father, James P.
Lanier, also had been the Dyer County chief
executive.
Neither Lanier nor Nashville attorney Alfred
Knight, who is representing him in his appeals,
could be reached Monday for comment.
On behalf of the Clinton administration,
Solicitor General Drew Days M, in his brief to the
Supreme Court, said that reversing the Lanier
decision is necessary to ensure that federal civil
rights law "will be able to continue to play its
central role in the protection of fundamental civil
rights."
He noted that the law has been used to
prosecute policemen and prison guards who beat up
prisoners and to curb excessive corporal punishment
by school officials.
In asking the court not to hear the case, Knight
said in a brief that the charges should not be allowed
under the civil rights law because Lanier's sexual
conduct was not part of his actions as a judge.
"These were personal, private actions which bore no
resemblance to and had no connection with the
performance of his official duties," he said.
But a gender law expert, M. C. Sungaila of
Newport Beach, Calif., said it is important for the
Supreme Court to recognize that rape and sexual
abuse is about the misuse of power by men over
women, not sex.
The court granted Sungaila the right to file her
own brief on behalf of the Southern Poverty Law
Center, the National Association of Human Rights
Workers and the California Women's Law Center.
She noted that since 1989 at least 17 judges,
police officers, prison guards and border patrolmen
have been convicted under the same law on similar
charges.
Mondays action "gives the court an opportunity
to reverse a clearly wrongheaded decision that not
only imperils the civil rights of women but the civil
rights of everyone in the nation," said Sungaila.
Sungaila said she believes that the case will be
argued before the court about December. The
Justice Department does not comment on pending
cases except through court pleadings.
U.S. Rep. Ed Bryant (R-Tenn.), who was the
U.S. attorney when Lanier was prosecuted, said
through a spokesman he is "confident that the
Supreme Court will carefully review the evidence of
this case and the testimony of the victims and
continue to uphold the law under which the
defendant was prosecuted."
U.S. Atty. Veronica Coleman of the Western
District of Tennessee said, "Obviously I'm pleased
they would consider that this case merits their
attention and review."
"Isn't that great?" Sandy Sanders, one of the
women who testified against Lanier at his trial, said
on hearing Monday that the Supreme Court would
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hear the case. Sanders, hired by Lanier as supervisor
and youth service officer for Dyer County Juvenile
Court, said the Supreme Court decision "was an
answer to prayer."
that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear this case,
I'm beginning to have a little trust in the system."
(Staff reporter Shirley Downing contributed to this
story.)
"I have really been praying hard about this he Commercial Appeal Memphis N Copyright
because I had lost all faith in the system. . . . Now 1996
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WOMEN'S FAITH IN SYSTEM RESTORED
The Tennessean
Tuesday, June 18, 1996
Gail Kerr, Staff Writer
Sandy Sanders said she never knew when her
boss called her into his office whether she would be
confronted with paperwork or his grabbing hands
and unwanted kisses.
Vivian Archie said she went to the same man's
office to interview for a job she needed because she
was terrified her parents would win custody of her
18-month-old daughter.
She later told a federal jury in Memphis that the
boss Dyer County Chancellor David Lanier forced
her to perform oral sex on him. While it was
happening, she said, Lanier threatened to take her
child away if she told anyone.
Both said they had nowhere to turn. Lanier was
a powerful judge in the county, from a powerful
political family, and his brother was the prosecutor.
Federal prosecutors, after receiving anonymous
tips, gave them a place to air their complaints. They
stepped in and investigated the Dyersburg, Tenn.,judge and sent Lanier, now 62, to prison for 25
years for violating the women's right to be free from
willful sexual assault He was freed after serving 27
months.
Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
decide whether the federal government had any
business getting involved. The court could order the
conviction reinstated.
The two victims said the decision helps them
believe again in a justice system that badly let them
down. Ten of 15 judges on a federal appeals court
had held that freedom from sexual attacks by public
officials is not a constitutional right.
In 1989, Sanders was working for the man
considered to be the most powerful in the little rural
town near Memphis, population 14,000. Lanier had
been the mayor. As judge, he presided over 80% of
the divorce and family custody cases and acted as
the Juvenile Court judge in two counties.
He is the son of the late James P. Lanier, who
was elected county court clerk in the 1930s and
reigned over area Democrats for the next few
decades.
Sanders testified that Lanier grabbed her breast
in his office. Weeks later, he fondled her buttocks
and pinned her to the wall while forcing kisses on
her.
"I was a little bit ignorant as to what to do," she
said yesterday. "Now, our county handbook has in
there about sexual harassment, but then it wasn't."
Archie went to Lanier in 1990 to apply for a
job. He had handled her divorce. She testified that
he exposed himself pinched her jaws and pulled her
hair to force her into oral sex.
"His brother was the DA. Who was I going to
tell, my mother? There was nobody," she said.
Sanders, Archie and seven other woman
testified that Lanier routinely and repeatedly
sexually assaulted them. One courtroom clerk
testified she had to pile legal papers in her lap to
stop Lanier from fondling her while he was on the
bench presiding over court.
Lanier said they all lied,.and that the charges
stemmed from political enemies.
The General Assembly stripped him of his
judgeship in 1993, but he still receives a $1,700
monthly pension. He was serving his time at a
federal prison in Talladega, Ala., when the 6th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati overturned
his conviction.
Lanier's attormey, Al Knight of Nashville, could
not be reached for comment yesterday. He argued
before the appeals court that even if Lanier did what
his accusers say, he did not violate the women's civil
rights unless he acted officially as a judge, "under
color of law."
Darcy O'Brien, an Oklahoma author who wrote
a book about the case called Power to Hurt, said
yesterday that the issue before the Supreme Court is
whether it is appropriate for the federal government
to intervene in a criminal case when the local
officials either cannot or will not act.
"This is the reason we have the federal
government," O'Brien said. "It is not only
appropriate, it is essential. It's a state's rights issue,
but it is also a human rights issue."
Today, Sandy Sanders is 36 and works for Dyer
County Juvenile Court.
"I am really happy, because I had lost faith in
the system," Sanders said. "I was angry with Lanier,
then my anger went from him to the court of
appeals. Now, I have put a little bit of trust back.
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"My son asks me when it will all be over. It is
not ever going to be over. We will remember it for
life."
Archie, now 30, works as a legal secretary in
Florida and said mental problems caused by the
attacks led to her mother gaining temporary custody
of her child.
"It's been a roller coaster. I am no longer
ashamed of being a victim. There were many women
before me. If they had stopped him, he wouldn't
have gotten to me."
BALLOT ISSUE?
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision to answer
whether the Constitution protects women from
sexual assault by state judges, police officers or
jailers may play out as a national political issue
before the legal question is decided next year.
It's a civil rights debate already capturing
attention. Republican presidential nominee-apparent
Bob Dole has criticized Clinton-appointed liberal
judges for trying to make new law by arguing that
women should have that federal protection.
"It would be a very important principle to have
established," said Judith L. Lichtman, president of
the Women's Legal Defense Fund.
"It is a way federal law can protect women from
the horrific, abusive behavior like that which Judge
[David] Lanier was convicted of."
But the conservative Free Congress Foundation
argued it is not necessary to elevate sexual assault to
a federal civil rights abuse.
-Freshman Republican Rep. Ed Bryant, who was
the U.S. attorney who prosecuted Lanier in
Memphis, was pleased by the Supreme Court's
decision.
"Federalizing crimes is always a legitimate
concern for those of us who don't want to see a
larger federal judiciary," he said. "But when you are
dealing with a situation where someone who was
using that position to his advantage to sexually
harass and molest people . .. then that certainly is a
federal civil rights issue."
The Tennessean Copyright 1996
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SEX CONVICTIONS OF JUDGE VOIDED
The Tennessean
Wednesday, January 24, 1996
Jim East, Staff Writer
His accusers said former Dyer County Judge
David W. Lanier grabbed the breasts or buttocks of
four female employees and exposed his genitals in
his courthouse chamber.
But yesterday, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned Lanier's eight sexual coercion
convictions and dismissed his 25-year prison
sentence because Lanier did not violate the federal
civil rights statute under which he was convicted.
A 1992 jury also decided that on two other
occasions, Lanier forced another woman to perform
oral sex on him when she went to his office to ask
him about a job. That woman had a child custody
case in Lanier's court.
"No matter how outrageous a defendant's
actions may be, he has to be charged with the
appropriate offense created by federal law," Chief
Judge Gilbert Merritt Jr. of Nashville wrote in the
73-page opinion handed down in Cincinnati.
The 9-6 decision means the court believes
Lanier, 64, should have been tried in state court and
not in federal court in Memphis because his actions
may have violated Tennessee sexual assault laws,
but not federal statutes.
He was the first sitting Tennessee judge sent to
prison for civil rights violations involving "sexual
coercion."
At the time of his conviction, Lanier had final
say over more than 80% of the divorce cases and
child custody proceedings in Dyer and Lake
counties. He also sat as juvenile court judge in both
counties, was a former Dyersburg mayor and is the
brother of a former district attorney.
During his trial, Lanier acknowledged he had
sex on the floor of his office with one of the women,
but he said it was her idea. The jury acquitted him of
that charge. Lanier also said the nine women who
testified against him lied, and he blamed the charges
on hometown political enemies and overzealous
federal prosecutors.
Lanier, who was unavailable for comment last
night, has been free since June 15, when the appeals
court ordered the jurist released from a federal
prison in Talladega, Ala.
However, Lanier's attorney, Al Knight of
Nashville, said that under the prosecution's theory
"if you happen to be employed by the state in some
capacity, particularly if you're an official of some
kind, if you injure somebody in a severe and
shocking sort of way that automatically is a
constitutional violation and a federal crime.
"There's some feeling that because some people
don't like what Judge Lanier did, that means he
ought to be convicted under this statute, and I think
the Court of Appeals' basic position is, if you have
a government of laws you have to apply the law, no
matter how you feel about the facts."
Dyer County District Attorney Phil Bivens, told
of the decision yesterday afternoon, reserved
comment until after he had read the opinion. Bivens
also would not say whether Lanier might be tried on
state charges.
"The right not to be assaulted is a clear right
under state law known to every reasonable person,"
Merritt wrote. "The defendant certainly knew his
conduct violated the law. But it is not publicly
known or understood that this right rises to the level
of a 'constitutional right.'
"It has not been declared as such by the
Supreme Court. It is not a right listed in the
Constitution, nor is it a well-established right of
procedural due process like the right to be tried
before being punished."
But in a scathing 23-page dissent, Judge Martha
Craig Daughtrey of Nashville wrote that Lanier's
actions were so outrageous they "shocked the
conscience" of ordinary citizens and should have
shocked the conscience of the appeals court.
"At least since the sealing of the Magna Carta
in 1215, Anglo-American jurisprudence has
recognized the right of citizens to be free from
interference with their bodily integrity, except under
the clear authority of law," Daughtrey wrote.
"Today, however, the [appeals court] majority
turns its back on 780 years of history on this
subject."
At the least, Daughtrey added, the decision
denied federal due process to the victims.
"It seems obvious to me as it did to the
prosecution, the district court, the federal jury and
the original panel that heard this appeal that federal
case law establishes that interference with an
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individual's bodily integrity under circumstances
similar to those involved in this case is in fact so
repulsive and deviant as to fall within the category
of substantive due process violations."
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95-1605 U.S. v. GONZALES
Sentencing-Mandatory term for using or carry-
ing firearm in relation to drug or violent offense-
Order that sentence run concurrently with state
sentence.-
Ruling below (CA 10, 65 F.3d 814, 57 CrL
1600):
Prohibition in 18 USC 924(c), which estab-
lishes mandatory five-year sentence for using or
carrying firearm during and in relation to drug
trafficking crime or crime of violence, against
such sentence's being concurrent "with any other
term of imprisonment including that imposed for
the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in
which the firearm was used or carried" relates
only to other federal sentences, and, therefore,
such sentence may run concurrently with pre-
viously imposed state sentence, which defendant
has already begun to serve, for same conduct.
Question presented: May sentence imposed un-
der Section 924(c), which requires mandatory
terms of imprisonment for defendants who use or
carry firearms during and in relation to certain
narcotics or violent offenses and provides that
"[njotwithstanding any other provision of law"
those prison terms "shall [not] run concurrently
with any other term of imprisonment," be or-
dered to run concurrently with state-law sentence
that defendant is already serving?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/4/96, by Drew S.
Days III, Sol. Gen., John C. Keeney, Acting
Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael R. Dreeben, Dpty. Sol.
Gen., and Miguel A. Estrada, Asst. to Sol. Gen.
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United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 30, 1995.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case began as a "reverse sting" operation by the Albuquerque Police Department. In a reverse sting,
police officers assume the role of drug dealers in order to infiltrate drug rings. At approximately 6:30 p.m.
on April 22, Officer Torres met Luis Leon at a Circle K in Albuquerque and was introduced to two of Mr.
Leon's co-conspirators, Miguel Gonzales and Orlenis Hernandez-Diaz. Detective Gloria later joined Officer
Torres and the three appellants at the Circle K and showed the appellants a 35-pound bale of marijuana that
was in the trunk of his undercover vehicle. After examining the marijuana, the appellants agreed to buy 100
pounds of marijuana for $60,000. The transaction was to occur the next day at 9:00 a.m.
At approximately 9:30 a.m. the next morning, Officer Torres met Mr. Leon and Mr. Gonzales at the
Circle K Mr. Len took Officer Torres to his apartment to view the purchase money. When he entered the
apartment, Officer Torres met co-conspirator Mr. Perez. Messrs. Perez, Hernandez-Diaz, and Leon were all
in the apartment at that time. The three dealers wanted to see the marijuana again before handing over the
$60,000, so Officer Torres took Mr. Leon back to the Circle K so he could again view the drugs. Officer
Torres telephoned Detective Gloria and instructed him to bring the marijuana to the Circle K. Upon reaching
the store, Appellant Leon once more examined the drugs, then took Officer Torres back to his apartment to
complete the transaction. On the way back to the apartment, Mr. Leon told Officer Torres to circle the area
to make sure there were no police cars in the vicinity. The officer did as he was instructed and passed two
marked patrol cars on the way. Mr. Leon became concerned and asked Officer Torres if he were a police
officer. Officer Torres replied that he was not and that he just wanted to complete the deal.
Once in the parking lot, Appellants Gonzales and Leon again said they wanted to see the marijuana, so
all four of them-Officer Torres, Detective Gloria, Appellant Gonzales, and Appellant Leon--went to the back
of the undercover vehicle to view the 100 pounds of marijuana. Then, Appellant Leon and Officer Torres
went upstairs to Mr. Leon's apartment to count the money.
Once inside the apartment, Mr. Hernandez-Diaz pulled a gun on Officer Torres. Mr. Hernandez-Diaz
then relieved Mr. Leon of his weapon, a handgun which was concealed in his waistband. Officer Torres was
taken hostage at gunpoint by Mr. Hernandez-Diaz, who apparently intended to steal the marijuana without
paying for it. Officer Torres was then taken into an adjacent bedroom and his hands and feet were taped
together and his mouth was taped shut.
It was at this point that the other officers came running up the stairs, kicked in the door, and arrested
Appellants Hernandez and Leon. Appellant Perez fled, but was later captured.
As Officer Torres was being held at gunpoint upstairs, Detective Gloria likewise was being held at
gunpoint by Appellant Gonzales downstairs. After seeing Officer Torres and Mr. Leon go to the apartment,
Mr. Gonzales tapped on the window of Detective Gloria's car and asked to see the marijuana again. Once
the trunk was open, Mr. Gonzales pulled out a handgun and pointed it at Detective Gloria, ordering him to
go upstairs. Detective Gloria ignored the orders and tried to slam the trunk shut. He then raised his hands
in the air, enabling Mr. Gonzales to see the gun in his holster. As Mr. Gonzales reached forward and took
the gun, a siren went off. Mr. Gonzales immediately fled the area. Detective Gloria then joined the other
officers who were running upstairs to rescue Officer Torres.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendants were all convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 846
and 18 U.S.C. § 2; possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D); and
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the use or carrying of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). They received
sentences ranging from 120 to 147 months.
In addition, the defendants had previously received substantial state sentences for convictions arising out
of the same conduct. The defendants, aside from Mr. Perez, have not directly challenged their conspiracy
or firearm convictions, but all have appealed their convictions for possession. They also each raise several
other issues.
DISCUSSION
All of the appellants received five-year sentences for using a firearm during a drug trafficking
offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). While the appellants do not dispute the sufficiency of the
conviction,1three-of the appellants (Messrs. Gonzales, Perez, and Hernandez-Diaz) claim that the district
court erred in ruling that they are to serve their sentence for this crime consecutive to the completion of their
state sentences arising out of the same conduct. The question we must answer is whether § 924(c)'s
mandatory five-year sentence may run concurrently with a previously imposed state sentence that a defendant
has already begun to serve. We hold that it can.
At sentencing, the district court ruled that each defendant's sentence for the underlying substantive
federal offenses should run concurrently with the sentence previously imposed by the state court for the
identical offenses. The district court then ordered that the five-year term imposed under § 924 (c) should run
consecutively to both the federal and the state charges, obviously reading § 924 (c) as barring the imposition
of a sentence concurrent with any prior state sentence. In so ruling, the district court joined good company--
every circuit to have considered the issue has held that § 924(c)'s plain language prohibits sentences imposed
under that statute from running concurrently with state sentences, although most of these opinions have not
been published.
In general, the choice between imposing concurrent and consecutive prison terms is left to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court.
The following language of § 924(c)(1) was in effect at the time of the relevant offenses:
"Whoever, during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime .. . for which he may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided
for such crime. . ., be sentenced to imprisonment for five years.... Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a
violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried."
There are two plausible ways in which the phrase "any other term of imprisonment" could be read. Taken
most literally, "any other term of imprisonment" would encompass not only all federal sentences but state
sentences as well. However, since this is a federal statute, with presumed concern for the treatment of federal
crimes, the language could be read more narrowly to apply only to federal sentences, excluding state
sentences from its scope. The Senate Report that accompanied the 1984 amendment to § 924(c) reads:
In either case, the defendant could not be given a suspended or probationary sentence, nor could any
sentence under the revised subsection be made to run concurrently with that for the predicate crime or
with that for any other offense. In addition, the Committee intends that the mandatory sentence under
the revised subsection 924(c) be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other
offense.
Both Courts of Appeals that have been aware of this stated congressional purpose have honored it.
[N]one of these opinions dealt with the anomaly that follows from combining the incorrect "consecutive to"
approach with an all-inclusive reading of "any other term of imprisonment."
The result for these defendants of such a combined reading, under which the five-year sentence on the
s 924(c) gun count would have to follow a previously imposed state sentence and would have to precede a
corresponding federal sentence, would be . .. more than double the custodial price that Congress and the
Guidelines have set for committing the total criminal conduct engaged in by these defendants.
The adoption of a reading that § 924(c)'s prohibition against concurrent sentences refers only to federal
sentences does not at all depreciate the severity of the crimes involved. Under such a reading, in which the
gun-charge sentence would begin immediately upon the district court's imposition of sentence (thus running
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concurrently with the pre-existing state sentence), and would be followed immediately by the other federal
sentences for any other substantive offenses, every defendant would be required to serve at least the
combined term for the gun offense and the underlying federal offense. Where, as here, a state sovereign has
previously viewed the same criminal conduct more seriously than Congress and the Sentencing Commission
have decreed, the defendant would therefore have to remain in prison until the longer state sentence had
expired.
Our conclusion that the phrase "any other offense" encompasses only federal offenses is required if we
are to follow Congress' stated intent that § 924(c) sentences be served prior to "any other offense," for if a
defendant is sentenced in state court first, there is no way in which a later-sentencing federal court can cause
the mandatory five-year § 924(c) sentence to be served before a state sentence that is already being served.
Our interpretation is also entirely consistent with the Guidelines....
CONCLUSION
The convictions of Messrs. Gonzales, Hernandez-Diaz, Perez and Leon for possession of drugs with
intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D), are REVERSED. The sentences imposed on the
defendants for the conspiracy and firearm convictions are VACATED, and these matters are REMANDED
to the district court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. The conviction of Mr. Perez for
conspiracy is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED and REMANDED.
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CRIME, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 'WEAKER' SEX
The Wall Street Journal, Rule of Law
Wednesday, August 21, 1996
Cathy Young
Bob Dole touts it as evidence of his support for
women's issues. The National Organization for
Women's president calls it "the most important
advancement of women's civil rights since the 1964
Civil Rights Act." This summer one federal judge
upheld it; another found it unconstitutional. The
Violence Against Women Act is in for a lengthy
legal battle likely to go all the way to the Supreme
Court.
The act, passed as part of the 1994 Crime Bill,
includes many noncontroversial items such as a
national domestic violence hot line and funds for
better lighting in parking lots. But it also has a
controversial civil rights provision allowing victims
of "gender-motivated violence" to sue their attackers
in federal court. This statute was struck down last
month by Judge Jackson Kiser in Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute when he dismissed
VPI student Christy Brzonkala's federal suit based
on an alleged sexual assault by two members of the
college's football team. Just a few weeks earlier in
Connecticut, Judge Janet Arterton came to the
opposite conclusion in Jane Doe v. John Doe, in
which the plaintiff claims that her husband, whom
she is divorcing, beat her and treated her like a slave
throughout 17 years of marriage.
Judge Kiser found that Congress had exceeded
its authority in passing the Violence Against
Women Act, since there is no basis for the federal
judiciary to have jurisdiction over sexual assault and
spousal abuse, crimes that properly belong in the
state courts. According to Judge Arterton, however,
the law was "a proper exercise of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause" because
"crimes of violence motivated by gender" adversely
affect interstate commerce through the victims'
medical costs, diminished productivity, and even the
fear that deters potential victims from taking certain
jobs and traveling on business.
In fact, the language of the law is extremely
vague as to what constitutes "gender-based
violence" - "a crime of violence committed because
of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least
in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."
In Brzonkala, the "evidence" of the misogynistic
bias of one of the defendants is that after the alleged
attack he told the young woman, "you'd better not
have any f---ing diseases" and that on another
occasion he reportedly made a crude remark
expressing a preference for sex with intoxicated
women.
- -.What is it, then, that supposedly makes rape and
domestic abuse different from any other violent
offenses? The Violence Against Women Act is
based on the premise that these crimes are often
rooted in antifemale bias, take such a toll on women
as to effectively rob them of equal rights, and are
not taken seriously by state courts and law
enforcement agencies because of sexism.
The first of these notions belongs in the realm
of ideology, reflecting the radical feminist theory
that rape and battering are part of a terrorist
campaign by men against women. The other two are
based on distorted statistics, cited in abundance in
the congressional findings that accompany the act
and, more recently, in Judge Arterton's ruling.
Take the findings' assertion that "violence is the
leading cause of injury to women ages 15-44, more
common than automobile accidents, muggings, and
cancer deaths combined." The 15 to 44 figure is
from a study of emergency room patients in a
high-crime inner-city area - hardly representative of
the population at large. The comparison to auto
accidents, muggings and cancer deaths, as
Newhouse News Service reporter Joe Hallinan
demonstrated in a 1994 story, was made up out of
thin air by feminist "advocacy researchers."
Another factoid from the congressional findings
- "About 35% of women visiting hospital
emergency rooms are [there] due to injuries
sustained as a result of domestic violence" - also
belongs in the Phony Statistics Hall of Fame. A
1995 Denver study found that of 648 women
surveyed in emergency departments, 11 -- fewer
than 2% - were seeking treatment for a beating by
a male partner. Besides, if being a victim of a
violent crime constitutes civil rights deprivation,
then men, who make up three-quarters of homicide
victims and two-thirds of victims of robbery and
aggravated assaults, should be the sex in need of
federal protection.
Nor is it true, at least today, that crimes that
predominantly affect women are treated as
"second-class crimes." When feminist criminologist
Kathleen Ferraro analyzed 1987-88 data from one
Arizona county, she found, contrary to her
expectations, that men who assaulted their wives or
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girlfriends were treated no more leniently than those
who attacked anyone else. Numerous other studies
confirm this pattern.
There is clearly no constitutional basis for
creating a special class of crimes defined by
nebulous ideological criteria. Yet some defenders of
the Violence Against Women Act are candid about
their indifference to constitutional niceties. "We can
look at it as lawyers and consider the fine points of
the law," Ms. Brzonkala's lawyer, Eileen Wagner,
declared on TV, "but we can look at it from the -
point of view of the women of this country."
Actually, there is no evidence that many women
will benefit from the civil rights statute of the act.
For most victims of rape or domestic violence, civil
litigation makes little sense since most of the
perpetrators have no assets to go after. Norman
Pattis, the attorney for the defendant in the
Connecticut case, argues that the law is "a litigation
weapon for upper middle class and wealthy women
in divorce cases" - a way to bring a divorce case
before a jury instead of simply a judge and put
pressure on the husband to offer a more favorable
settlement.
In cases such as Brzonkala, the Violence
Against Women Act is being used for political
symbolism and publicity. In her brief, Ms. Wagner
cites the media coverage the case has received and
asserts that the plaintiffs goal is nothing less than to
initiate "a wide national debate about why the 'no
means yes' myth still persists." Of course this very
same case was too weak to get to first base in the
criminal justice system; a Virginia grand jury
refused to indict the alleged assailants.
In the legal battle to come, defenders of the act
are heartened by the fact that Judge Kiser is the
same judge who has-just been overruled by the
Supreme Court on the issue of opening the Virginia
Military Institute to women. Whatever one thinks of
the VMI case, this one is findamentally different: It
is not about equal treatment but about special
privilege for female victims of certain crimes.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who played a key role
in the VMI decision, has been often described as a
feminist of the old "equality" school who reportedly
dislikes the newer brand of protectionist "victim
feminism." Before long, we may get a chance to see
just how she will apply these principles to the
Violence Against Women Act.
Ms. Young is vice president of the
Washington-based Women's Freedom Network.
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